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Abstract
Problem/Condition: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have maintained a collaborative surveillance system for the occurrences and
causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs).This surveillance system is the primary source of data concerning
the scope and effects of waterborne diseases on persons in the United States.
Reporting Period Covered: This summary includes data regarding outbreaks occurring during January 1999–December
2000 and previously unreported outbreaks occurring in 1995 and 1997.
Description of the System: The surveillance system includes data for outbreaks associated with drinking water and
recreational water. State, territorial, and local public health departments are primarily responsible for detecting and
investigating WBDOs and voluntarily reporting them to CDC on a standard form. The unit of analysis for the WBDO
surveillance system is an outbreak, not an individual case of a waterborne disease. Two criteria must be met for an event
to be defined as a WBDO. First, >2 persons must have experienced a similar illness after either ingestion of drinking
water or exposure to water encountered in recreational or occupational settings. This criterion is waived for single cases
of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis and for single cases of chemical poisoning if waterquality data indicate contamination by the chemical. Second, epidemiologic evidence must implicate water as the probable source of the illness.
Results: During 1999–2000, a total of 39 outbreaks associated with drinking water was reported by 25 states. Included
among these 39 outbreaks was one outbreak that spanned 10 states. These 39 outbreaks caused illness among an
estimated 2,068 persons and were linked to two deaths. The microbe or chemical that caused the outbreak was identified for 22 (56.4%) of the 39 outbreaks; 20 of the 22 identified outbreaks were associated with pathogens, and two were
associated with chemical poisoning. Of the 17 outbreaks involving acute gastroenteritis of unknown etiology, one was
a suspected chemical poisoning, and the remaining 16 were suspected as having an infectious cause. Twenty-eight
(71.8%) of 39 outbreaks were linked to groundwater sources; 18 (64.3%) of these 28 groundwater outbreaks were
associated with private or noncommunity wells that were not regulated by EPA. Fifty-nine outbreaks from 23 states
were attributed to recreational water exposure and affected an estimated 2,093 persons. Thirty-six (61.0%) of the 59
were outbreaks involving gastroenteritis. The etiologic agent was identified in 30 (83.3%) of 36 outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis. Twenty-two (61.1%) of 36 gastroenteritis-related outbreaks were associated with pools or interactive
fountains. Four (6.8%) of the 59 recreational water outbreaks were attributed to single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis (PAM) caused by Naegleria fowleri. All four cases were fatal. Fifteen (25.4%) of the 59 outbreaks were
associated with dermatitis; 12 (80.0%) of 15 were associated with hot tubs or pools. In addition, recreational water
outbreaks of leptospirosis, Pontiac fever, and chemical keratitis, as well as two outbreaks of leptospirosis and Pontiac
fever associated with occupational exposure were also reported to CDC.
Interpretation: The proportion of drinking water outbreaks associated with surface water increased from 11.8%
during 1997–1998 to 17.9% in 1999–2000. The proportion of outbreaks (28) associated with groundwater sources
increased 87% from the previous reporting period (15 outbreaks), and these outbreaks were primarily associated (60.7%)
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with consumption of untreated groundwater. Recreational water outbreaks involving gastroenteritis doubled (36 outbreaks) from the number of outbreaks reported in the previous reporting period (18 outbreaks). These outbreaks were
most frequently associated with Cryptosporidium parvum (68.2%) in treated water venues (e.g., swimming pools or
interactive fountains) and by Escherichia coli O157:H7 (21.4%) in freshwater venues. The increase in the number of
outbreaks probably reflects improved surveillance and reporting at the local and state level as well as a true increase in
the number of WBDOs.
Public Health Action: CDC and others have used surveillance data to identify the types of water systems, their
deficiencies, and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks and evaluated current technologies for providing safe
drinking water and safe recreational water. Surveillance data are used also to establish research priorities, which can lead
to improved water-quality regulations. Only the groundwater systems under the influence of surface water are required
to disinfect their water supplies, but EPA is developing a groundwater rule that specifies when corrective action (including disinfection) is required. CDC and EPA are conducting epidemiologic studies to assess the level of waterborne
illness attributable to municipal drinking water in nonoutbreak conditions. Rules under development by EPA — the
Ground Water Rule (GWR), the Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule (LT2ESWTR), and Stage 2
Disinfection Byproduct Rules (DBPR) — are expected to further protect the public from contaminants and disinfection byproducts in drinking water. Efforts by EPA under the Beaches Environmental Assessment, Closure, and Health
(BEACH) program are aimed at reducing the risks for infection attributed to ambient recreational water by strengthening beach standards and testing; providing faster laboratory test methods; predicting pollution; investing in health and
methods research; and improving public access to information regarding both the quality of the water at beaches and
information concerning health risks associated with swimming in polluted water. EPA’s Beach Watch (available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/beaches) provides online information regarding water quality at U.S. beaches, local
protection programs, and other beach-related programs. CDC partnered with a consortium of local and national pool
associations to develop a series of health communication materials for the general public who attend treated recreational water venues and to staff who work at those venues. CDC has also developed a recreational water outbreak
investigation toolkit that can be used by public health professionals. All of the CDC materials are accessible at the CDC
Healthy Swimming website (http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming).

Introduction
During 1920–1970, statistical data regarding U.S. waterbornedisease outbreaks (WBDOs) were collected by multiple
researchers and federal agencies (1). Since 1971, CDC, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have maintained a collaborative surveillance system that tracks the
occurrences and causes of WBDOs (2–6). This surveillance
system includes data regarding outbreaks associated with
drinking water, recreational water, and other types of water
exposures. This report includes data for 1999 and 2000 and
for previously unreported drinking water-associated outbreaks
that occurred in 1995 and 1997.
CDC’s and EPA’s surveillance activities are intended to
1) characterize the epidemiology of WBDOs; 2) identify the
etiologic agents that caused WBDOs and determine why the
outbreaks occurred; 3) train public health personnel to detect
and investigate WBDOs; and 4) collaborate with local, state,
federal, and international agencies on initiatives to prevent
waterborne disease. Data obtained through this surveillance
system are useful for identifying major deficiencies in providing safe drinking water and recreational water. Surveillance

information can influence research priorities, lead to improved
water-quality regulations, and illustrate the burden of illness
attributed to water.

Background
EPA Regulations
Drinking Water
Public water systems are regulated under the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 and its subsequent 1986 and
1996 amendments (7–9) (Box). Under SDWA, EPA is
authorized to set national standards to protect drinking water
and its sources against naturally occurring or man-made contaminants. The 1996 SDWA amendments require EPA to
publish a list every 5 years of contaminants that are known or
anticipated to occur in public water systems and that might
need to be regulated. The first list was called the drinking
water Contaminant Candidate List (CCL). CCL contained
60 contaminants/contaminant groups, included 10 pathogens,
and was published in the Federal Register on March 2, 1998
(10). A decision concerning whether to regulate >5 contaminants from CCL was required by August 2001. Microbial
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BOX. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations regarding drinking water, 1974–2003

Regulation/date

Description

Safe Drinking Water Act/1974 and
1986 and 1996 amendments

Authorizes EPA to set national standards to protect drinking water and its sources

Total Coliform Rule (TCR)/and
Maximum Contaminant Level
(MCL)/1989

Requires routine monitoring for total coliforms of all public water systems plus periodic
on-site inspections for systems that take <5 samples/month to evaluate and document treatment, storage, distribution network, operation and maintenance, and overall management.
Systems that collect >40 samples/month (i.e., typically, systems that serve >33,000 persons)
violate MCL if >5.0% of the samples collected during each month are positive for total coliforms;
systems that collect <40 samples/month violate MCL if two samples during the month are
positive for total coliforms. If a system has a total coliform-positive sample, then 1) that sample
must be tested for the presence of fecal coliforms or Escherichia coli, and 2) three repeat samples
must be collected (four, if the system collects <1 routine sample/month) within 24 hours and
analyzed for total coliforms. If positive, the sample must be analyzed for fecal coliforms or
Es. coli. In addition, >5 routine samples must be collected during the next month of sampling,
regardless of system size. For any size system, if two consecutive total coliform-positive samples
occur at one site during a month, and one of these samples is also fecal coliform-positive or
Es. coli-positive, the system has an acute violation of the Maximum Contaminant Level and
must notify the state and the public immediately.

Surface Water Treatment Rule
(SWTR)/1989

Covers all water systems that use surface water or groundwater under the direct influence of
surface water; all systems must disinfect their water, and the majority of systems must filter
their water also, unless they meet EPA-specified filter-avoidance criteria that define highquality source water. Specific requirements include
• a combined filter-effluent–performance standard for turbidity (i.e., for rapid granular
filters, 0.5 nephelometric turbidity unit [NTU] maximum for 95% of measurements [taken
every 4 hours] during a month) and no single NTU reading >5.0;
• watershed protection, redundant disinfection capability, and other requirements for
unfiltered systems;
• a 0.2-mg/L disinfectant residual entering the distribution system; and
• maintenance of a detectable disinfectant residual in all parts of the distribution
system.
This rule requires that all such systems reduce the level of Giardia by 99.9% (3-log reduction)
and viruses by 99.99% (4-log reduction) through a combination of removal (filtration) and
inactivation (disinfection).

Information Collection Rule/
1996–1998

Requires systems serving >100,000 persons to provide treatment data and monitor disinfection byproducts and source water quality parameters. Surface water systems are also required
to monitor Cryptosporidium, Giardia, total culturable viruses, and total and fecal coliforms or
Es. coli >1 time/month for 18 months. Results provided information to facilitate development
of the Long Term 2 Enhanced SWTR, which is intended to protect against microbial risks by
targeting those systems with suboptimal quality source water and to balance the health risks
associated with disinfection byproducts and the anticipated Stage 2 Disinfection Byproduct Rule.

Interim Enhanced Surface Water
Treatment Rule (IESWTR)/1998

Follow-up to SWTR that covers all public systems using surface water or groundwater under
the direct influence of surface water and serving >10,000 persons. Key provisions include
• a 2-log Cryptosporidium-removal requirement for filtered systems;
• strengthened combined filter-effluent–turbidity performance standards for systems using
conventional filtration treatment or direct filtration (0.3 NTU maximum for 95% of
measurements during a month and no single NTU reading >1.0);
• individual filter turbidity monitoring provisions;
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BOX (Continued). Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations regarding drinking water, 1974–2003

Regulation/date
•
•

•
•
•

Description
disinfection profile and benchmark provisions to ensure continued levels of microbial protection while facilities take necessary steps to comply with new disinfection byproduct standards;
revision of the definition of groundwater under the influence of surface water and the
watershed-control requirements for unfiltered public water systems to include detection
of Cryptosporidium;
requirements for covers on newly finished water reservoirs;
sanitary surveys for all surface water systems regardless of size; and
an MCL goal of zero oocysts for Cryptosporidium.

Lead and Copper Rule/2000
changes

Streamlines requirements, promotes consistent national implementation, and reduces the
burden for water systems.

Long Term 1 Enhanced SWTR
(LT1ESWTR)/2002 and the Filter
Backwash Recycling Rule (FBRR)/
2001

Companion regulations for IESWTR; LT1ESWTR applies to public water systems that use
surface water or groundwater under the direct influence of surface water and that serve <10,000
persons. FBRR regulates how treatment plants recycle water that has been used to backwash a
filter or that has been extracted from treatment plant sludge. FBRR regulates the point in the
treatment plant at which the contaminated recycle water may be introduced, assuring that the
water is subject to the entire particle and Cryptosporidium parvum removal process.

Long Term 2 Enhanced SWTR
(LT2ESWTR)/expected in 2003

Applies to all systems using surface water or groundwater under the influence of surface water;
will provide additional protection against Cryptosporidium. Systems will be assigned to a treatment category on the basis of their source-water Cryptosporidium levels; the category then
determines how much additional treatment is required.

Stage 2 Disinfection Byproduct
Rule (DBPR)/expected in 2003

Will apply to community water systems and nontransient noncommunity water systems that
use an alternative to ultraviolet disinfection or deliver disinfected water; systems will be
required to monitor for total trihalomethanes and the sum of five haloacetic acids and comply
with MCLs at each monitoring location as a locational running annual average.

Ground Water Rule (GWR) (1996
amendment to EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Act)/expected to be
finalized in 2003

Applies to public groundwater systems (i.e., systems that have >15 service connections, or
regularly serve >25 persons daily for >60 days/year) or any system that mixes surface and
groundwater if the groundwater is added directly to the distribution system and provided to
consumers without treatment. Establishes multiple barriers to protect against bacteria and
viruses in drinking water from groundwater sources; establishes targeted strategy to identify
groundwater systems at high risk for fecal contamination. Key areas include
• system sanitary surveys;
• hydrogeologic sensitivity assessments for nondisinfected systems;
• source-water microbial monitoring by systems that do not disinfect and that draw from
hydrogeologically sensitive aquifers or have detected fecal indicators within the system’s
distribution system;
• corrective action by any system with substantial deficiencies or positive microbial samples
indicating fecal contamination; and
• compliance monitoring for systems that disinfect to ensure that they reliably achieve 4-log
(99.99%) inactivation or removal of viruses.
GWR does not apply to privately owned wells that serve <25 persons (e.g., individual homeowner wells).
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contamination is regulated under the Total Coliform Rule
(TCR) of 1989 and the Surface Water Treatment Rule
(SWTR) of 1989 (11–13). SWTR covers all water systems
that use surface water or groundwater under the direct influence of surface water (Glossary). SWTR is intended to protect against exposure to Giardia intestinalis, viruses, and
Legionella, as well as selected other pathogens. In 1998, EPA
promulgated the Interim Enhanced Surface Water Treatment
Rule (IESWTR) (14), which provides additional protection
against Cryptosporidium and other waterborne pathogens for
systems that serve >10,000 persons. In 2002, EPA finalized
the Long Term 1 Enhanced SWTR (LT1ESWTR) for public
water systems that use surface water or groundwater under
the direct influence of surface water and serve <10,000 persons (15). LT1ESWTR was proposed in combination with
the Filter Backwash Recycling Rule (FBRR), which was finalized in 2001 (16,17).
The 1996 Amendments require EPA to develop regulations
that require disinfection of groundwater systems as necessary
to protect the public health; EPA has proposed the Ground
Water Rule (GWR) to meet this mandate (18). GWR specifies the appropriate use of disinfection in groundwater and
addresses other components of groundwater systems to
ensure public health protection. GWR applies to public
groundwater systems (systems that have >15 service connections or regularly serve >25 persons/day for >60 days/year).
This rule also applies to any system that mixes surface and
groundwater if the groundwater is added directly to the distribution system and provided to consumers without treatment. GWR does not apply to privately owned wells.
Additional protection of groundwater from both chemical and
microbial contamination from shallow wells (including cesspools) is expected to be provided as a result of recent revisions
to the Underground Injection Control Regulations, published
December 7, 1999 (19).
To fill gaps in existing data regarding occurrence of microbial pathogens and other indicators of microbial contamination, occurrence of disinfection byproducts, and
characterization of treatment processes, EPA promulgated the
Information Collection Rule in 1996 (20), which required
systems serving >100,000 persons to provide treatment data
and monitor disinfection byproducts and source-water–quality
parameters. Surface water systems are also required to monitor for the presence of Cryptosporidium, Giardia, total
culturable viruses, and total* (Glossary) and fecal coliforms
or Escherichia coli >1 time/month for 18 months. The required
* Total coliforms are considered indicator organisms that typically do not
cause disease but might be associated with the presence of other diseasecausing organisms. Additional information regarding total coliforms is
available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/dwa/electronic/tcr.pdf.
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monitoring ended in December 1998, and data were analyzed.
EPA also made minor changes in 2000 to the Lead and
Copper Rule to streamline requirements, promote consistent
national implementation, and in certain cases, reduce the
burden for water systems. The action levels of 0.015 mg/L for
lead and 1.3 mg/L for copper remain the same (21).
Recreational Water
Regulation of recreational water is determined by state and
local governments. Standards for operating, disinfecting, and
filtering public swimming and wading pools are regulated by
state and local health departments and, as a result, are varied.
In 1986, EPA established a guideline for microbiological
water quality for recreational freshwater (e.g., lakes and ponds)
and marine water (22). The guideline recommends that the
monthly geometric mean concentration of organisms in freshwater should be <33/100 mL for enterococci or <126/100
mL for Es. coli. States have latitude regarding their guidelines
or regulations and can post warning signs to alert potential
bathers until water quality improves. Unlike treated venues
where disinfection can be used to address problems with
microbiological quality of the water, contaminated freshwater can require weeks or months to improve or return to normal. Prompt identification of potential sources of
contamination and remedial action is necessary to return bathing water to an appropriate quality for recreational use (23).
EPA’s Action Plan for Beaches and Recreational Waters
(Beach Watch) was developed as part of the Clean Water
Action Plan.† The intent of Beach Watch is to assist state,
tribal, and local authorities in strengthening and extending
programs that specifically protect users of recreational
waters. As part of the Beaches Act of 2000, the U.S. Congress
directed EPA to also develop a new set of guidelines for recreational water based on new water-quality indicators. Beginning in 2003, EPA will be conducting a series of epidemiologic
studies at recreational fresh and marine beaches in the United
States. These studies will be used to develop guidelines for
using the new water-quality indicators to be included in new
EPA guidelines.
Data collected as part of the national WBDO surveillance
system are used to describe the epidemiology of waterborne
diseases in the United States. Data regarding water systems
and deficiencies implicated in these outbreaks are used to
assess whether regulations for water treatment and monitoring of water quality are adequate to protect the public against
disease. Surveillance also enables identifying etiologic agents
and environmental or behavioral risk factors that are
†

Additional information is available at http://www.cleanwater.gov.
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responsible for these outbreaks. This information is used to
inform public health and regulatory agencies, water utilities,
pool operators, and other stakeholders of new or reemerging
trends that might necessitate different interventions and
changes in policies and resource allotment.

Methods
Data Sources
State, territorial, and local public health agencies have primary responsibility for detecting and investigating WBDOs,
and they voluntarily report them to CDC on a standard form
(CDC form 52.12, which is available at http://www.cdc.gov/
healthyswimming). The form solicits data related to 1) characteristics of the outbreak, including person, place, time, and
location of the outbreak; 2) results from epidemiological studies conducted; 3) specimen and water sample testing; and 4)
factors contributing to the outbreak, including environmental factors, water distribution, and disinfection concerns. Each
year, CDC requests reports from state and territorial epidemiologists or from persons designated as WBDO surveillance
coordinators. Additional information regarding water quality and treatment is obtained from the state’s drinking water
agency as needed. Numerical and text data are abstracted from
the outbreak form and supporting documents and are
entered into a database before analysis.

Definitions§
The unit of analysis for the WBDO surveillance system is
an outbreak, not an individual case of a waterborne disease.
Two criteria must be met for an event to be defined as a
WBDO. First, >2 persons must have experienced a similar
§

Additional terms are defined in the glossary.
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illness after either ingestion of drinking water or exposure to
water encountered in recreational or occupational settings.
This criterion is waived for single cases of laboratoryconfirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis and for single
cases of chemical poisoning if water-quality data indicate contamination by the chemical. Second, epidemiologic evidence
(Table 1) must implicate water as the probable source of the
illness. For drinking water, reported outbreaks caused by contaminated water or ice at the point of use (e.g., a contaminated water faucet or serving container) are not classified as
WBDOs.
If primary cases (i.e., among persons exposed to contaminated water) and secondary cases (i.e., among persons who
became ill after contact with primary persons) are distinguished
on the outbreak report form, only primary cases are included
in the total number of cases. If both actual and estimated case
counts are included on the outbreak report form, the estimated case count can be used if the population was sampled
randomly or the estimated count was calculated by applying
the attack rate to a standardized population.
Public water systems, which are classified as either community or noncommunity (Glossary), are regulated under SDWA.
Of the approximately 170,000 public water systems in the
United States, 113,000 (66.5 %) are noncommunity systems,
of which 93,000 are transient systems (i.e., public water systems that regularly serve >25 of the same persons for >6
months/year [e.g., highway rest stations, restaurants, and parks
with their own public water systems]) and 20,000 are
nontransient systems (Glossary). A total of 54,000 systems
(31.8%) are community systems. Community water systems
serve approximately 264 million persons in the United States
(96.0% of the U.S. population). Approximately 11 million
persons (4.0%) rely on private or individual water systems
(24,25) (Glossary). These statistics exclude outbreaks associated with these sources because they are not intended for drink-

TABLE 1. Classification of investigations of waterborne-disease outbreaks — United States*
Class†

Epidemiologic data

Water-quality data

I

Adequate§
Data were provided regarding exposed and unexposed persons,
and the relative risk or odds ratio was >2 or the p-value was <0.05

Provided and adequate
Historical information or laboratory data (e.g., the history that a
chlorinator malfunctioned or a water main broke, no detectable freechlorine residual, or the presence of coliforms in the water)

II

Adequate

Not provided or inadequate (e.g., stating that a lake was crowded)

III

Provided, but limited
Epidemiologic data were provided that did not meet the criteria for
Class I, or the claim was made that ill persons had no exposures
in common besides water, but no data were provided

Provided and adequate

IV

Provided, but limited

Not provided or inadequate

* Outbreaks of Pseudomonas and other water-related dermatitis and single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis or of illness resulting from
chemical poisoning are not classified according to this scheme.
†
On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data that were provided on CDC form 52.12.
§
Adequate data were provided to implicate water as the source of the outbreak.
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ing and are not considered to be public water systems. Also
excluded from these statistics are the millions of persons who
use noncommunity systems while traveling or working.
In this surveillance system, outbreaks associated with water
not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used
by campers and boaters; irrigation water and other nonpotable
sources with or without taps) are also classified as individual
systems (Glossary). Sources used for bottled water are also
classified as individual systems; bottled water is not regulated
by EPA but is subject to regulation by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
Each drinking water system associated with a WBDO is
classified as having one of the deficiencies in the following
list. If >1 deficiency is noted on the outbreak report form, the
deficiency that most likely caused the outbreak is noted.
Deficiency classifications are as follows:
1: untreated surface water;
2: untreated groundwater;
3: treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of
disinfection, chronically inadequate disinfection, or
inadequate or no filtration);
4: distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection,
contamination of water mains during construction or
repair, or contamination of a storage facility); and
5: unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated
bottled water) or water source not intended for drinking
(e.g., irrigation water tap).
Recreational waters include swimming pools, wading pools,
whirlpools, hot tubs, spas, water parks, interactive fountains, and
fresh and marine surface waters. Although the WBDO surveillance system includes whirlpool- and hot tub-associated outbreaks
of dermatitis caused by Pseudomonas aeruginosa, wound infections resulting from waterborne organisms are not included.

as the vehicle for the outbreak, but also to understand the
circumstances that led to the outbreak.
A classification of I indicates that adequate epidemiologic
and water-quality data were reported (Table 1); however, the
classification does not necessarily imply whether an investigation was optimally conducted. Likewise, a classification of
II, III, or IV should not be interpreted to mean that the
investigations were inadequate or incomplete. Outbreaks and
the resulting investigations occur under various circumstances,
and not all outbreaks can or should be rigorously investigated.
In addition, outbreaks that affect fewer persons are more likely
to receive a classification of III, rather than I, on the basis of
the relatively limited sample size available for analysis.

Results
Outbreaks Associated with Drinking Water
During 1999–2000, a total of 39 outbreaks associated with
drinking water were reported by 25 states (see Appendix A for
selected case descriptions). One of the 39 outbreaks was a
multistate outbreak of Salmonella Bareilly that included cases
from 10 states. Of the 39 total drinking water outbreaks, 15
outbreaks were reported for 1999 and 24 for 2000. Florida
reported the most outbreaks (15) during this period. These
39 outbreaks caused illness among an estimated 2,068
persons; 122 persons were hospitalized, and two died. The
median number of persons affected in an outbreak was 13.5
(range: 2–781). Outbreaks peaked during the summer months
(Figure 1), June–August.
FIGURE 1. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks
associated with drinking water, by etiologic agent and month
— United States, 1999–2000 (n = 38)*
12

Outbreak Classification

10

Number of outbreaks

WBDOs reported to the surveillance system are classified
according to the strength of the evidence implicating water as
the vehicle of transmission (Table 1). The classification scheme
(i.e., Classes I–IV) is based on the epidemiologic and waterquality data provided with the outbreak report form. Epidemiologic data are weighted more than water-quality data.
Although outbreaks without water-quality data might be
included in this summary, reports that lack epidemiologic data
were excluded. Outbreaks of dermatitis and single cases of
either primary amebic meningoencephalitis or illness resulting from chemical poisoning were not classified according to
this scheme. Weighting of epidemiologic data does not
preclude the relative importance of both types of data. The
purpose of the outbreak system is not only to implicate water

7

8

†

AGI
Infectious
Chemical

6
4
2
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

1999–2000
* One outbreak of Salmonella Bareilly was not included.
†
Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
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Nine of the 39 (23.1%) outbreaks were assigned to Class I
on the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data; three
(7.7%) were Class II; 25 (64.1%) were Class III; and 1 was
Class IV (Table 1). One of two outbreaks associated with a
chemical etiology was not assigned a class because that
outbreak was a single case of illness resulting from nitrate
poisoning associated with consumption of water from a private well. Outbreaks are listed by state (Tables 2 and 3) and
are tabulated by the etiologic agent, the water system type
(Table 4), and by the type of deficiency and type of water
system type (Table 5).
Etiologic Agents
Twenty (51.3%) of the 39 outbreaks were of known infectious etiology; 17 (43.6%) were of unknown etiology; and
two (5.1%) were attributed to chemical poisoning. Of the
20 outbreaks with known infectious etiology, seven (35.0%)
were caused by parasites; nine (45.0%) were caused by
bacteria; and four (20.0%) were caused by viruses (Figure 2)
(Appendix A).
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Parasites. Seven outbreaks affecting 57 persons were
attributed to parasitic infection: six Giardia outbreaks and
one Cryptosporidium outbreak. Six outbreaks of Giardia associated with drinking water affected 52 persons from five states:
Florida (two outbreaks), New Mexico (one), New Hampshire
(one), Minnesota (one), and Colorado (one). These outbreaks
occurred in January (one), June (one), July (one), August (one),
and September (two). Four outbreaks were associated with
well water systems, and two were associated with surface
water systems. Two outbreaks caused by G. intestinalis involved
possible contamination of wells by animal feces. G. intestinalis
can infect mammalian hosts, which in turn, can serve as reservoirs for human infection. Water treatment failure was a
factor in two other outbreaks of Giardia.
Bacteria. Nine outbreaks affecting an estimated 1,166 persons were attributed to bacterial infection: four Es. coli O157:
H7 outbreaks, one Campylobacter jejuni, one Salmonella
Typhimurium, one Sa. Bareilly, and two mixed Ca. jejuni and
shiga toxin-producing Es. coli (O157:H7 or O111) outbreaks.

TABLE 2. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water — United States, 1999 (n = 15)*
Month

Class†

Etiologic agent

California
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Missouri
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

Jul
Jan
Jan
Mar
Mar
May
Aug
Jun
Nov
Jul
Aug

III
III
III
III
III
III
III
II
IV
I
I

Texas
Washington
Washington
Wisconsin

Nov
Jul
Aug
Apr

I
II
I
NA***

AGI**
AGI
Giardia intestinalis
AGI
AGI
AGI
AGI††
Salmonella Typhimurium
Sodium hydroxide
Small round-structured virus§§
Escherichia coli O157:H7,
Campylobacter jejuni¶¶
Es. coli O157:H7
AGI
AGI
Nitrate

State

Number
of cases

Type of
system§

Deficiency¶

31
4
2
6
3
3
4
124
2
70

Ncom
Com
Ind
Com
Com
Ind
Com
Com
Com
Ncom

2
2
2
4
4
2
4
3
3
3

Well
Well
Well
River/stream
Well
Well
River/stream
Well
Well
Spring

Camp
Community
Household
Apartment
Community
Household
Apartment
Community
Community
Camp

781
22
46
68
1

Ncom
Com
Ind
Ncom
Ind

2
3
1
2
2

Well
Well
River/creek
Well
Well

Fairgrounds
Community
Household
Soccer match
Household

Source

Setting

* An outbreak is defined as 1) >2 persons experiencing a similar illness after ingestion of drinking water and 2) epidemiologic evidence that implicates
water as the probable source of the illness.
† On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
§ Com = community; Ncom = noncommunity; Ind = individual; community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15
connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or
mobile home park with >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient.
Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons.
Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other
nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as individual systems.
¶ 1 = untreated surface water; 2 = untreated groundwater; 3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate
disinfection, and inadequate or no filtration); 4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction
or repair, and contamination of a storage facility); and 5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated bottled water).
** Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
†† Unidentified chemical poisoning.
§§ Three persons had stool specimens that tested positive for small round-structured virus, and one person’s stool specimen tested positive for Ca. jejuni.
¶¶ A total of 126 persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Es. coli O157:H7; 43 persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Ca. jejuni.
One person’s stool specimen tested positive for both organisms.
*** Not applicable, see Table 1.
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TABLE 3. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water — United States, 2000 (n = 24)*
State
California
California
California
Colorado
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Idaho
Idaho
Idaho
Kansas
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Ohio
Utah
West Virginia
Multistate

Month
Jul
Jul
Sep
Aug
Mar
Apr
Apr
Jun
Jul
Jul
Aug
Sep
Dec
Apr
Jun
Jul
Jun
Jun
Sep
Jul
Aug
Aug
Jun
Apr–Aug

Class†
I
I
III
III
III
III
I
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
II
I
III
III
I

Etiologic agent
Norwalk-like virus
Escherichia coli O157:H7
AGI**
Giardia intestinalis
AGI††
AGI
AGI
AGI§§
AGI
AGI
AGI
G. intestinalis
Cryptosporidium parvum
Es. coli O157:H7
Campylobacter jejuni
AGI
Norwalk-like virus
G. intestinalis¶¶
G. intestinalis
G. intestinalis
Es. coli O157:H7
Ca. jejuni†††
Norwalk-like virus
Salmonella Bareilly

Number
of cases

Type of
system§

147
5
63
27
19
21
71
2
3
3
4
2
5
4
15
65
86
12
5
4
29
102
123
84

Ncom
Ind
Ind
Ncom
Com
Com
Ind
Ind
Ind
Ind
Ind
Ind
Com
Ind
Ncom
Ncom
Ncom
Ncom
Ind
Ind
Com
Ind
Ncom
Ind

Deficiency¶
2
5
5
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
5
2
2
2
2
3
5
4
5
3
5§§§

Source
Well
River/creek
Irrigation system
River
Well
Well
Well
Well
Well
Well
Well
Well
Well
Irrigation canal
Spring
Well
Well
Well
Well
River
Surface water***
Irrigation water
Wells
Municipal/spring§§§

Setting
Camp
Camp
Football game
Resort
Trailer park
Trailer park
Community
Household
Household
Household
Household
Household
Community
Household
Camp
Restaurant
Reception hall
Camp
Household
Rafting trip
Fairgrounds
Football camp
Camp
Wells/bottled water***

* An outbreak is defined as 1) >2 persons experiencing a similar illness after ingestion of drinking water and 2) epidemiologic evidence that implicates
water as the probable source of the illness.
† On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
§ Com = community; Ncom = noncommunity; Ind = individual; community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve
>15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community,
subdivision, or mobile home park with >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient
or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not
(e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or
<25 persons. Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water;
and other nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as individual systems.
¶ 1 = untreated surface water; 2 = untreated groundwater; 3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate
disinfection, and inadequate or no filtration); 4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction
or repair, and contamination of a storage facility); and 5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated bottled water).
** Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
†† Persons also reported rashes in addition to acute gastrointestinal illness.
§§ One person had a stool specimen that tested positive for Blastocystis hominis.
¶¶ Eight persons had stool specimens that tested positive for G. intestinalis; one stool specimen tested positive for Dientamoeba fragilis.
*** Type of water was not specified on report form.
††† Thirty-seven persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Ca. jejuni; four persons’ stool specimens tested positive for Es. coli O157:H7, and three
persons had stool that tested positive for Es. coli O111.
§§§ The outbreak implicated both drinking water from private wells and springs and water bottled by one facility. The bottling facility used two sources of water.

The two outbreaks with multiple pathogens caused the two
largest bacterial drinking water outbreaks reported during this
study period.
Viruses. During this period, four outbreaks involving viral
gastroenteritis were reported. A total of 426 persons reported
illness; no hospitalizations or deaths were reported in association with these four viral outbreaks. Three of the four outbreaks occurred in camp facilities in California, New Mexico,
and West Virginia. All three water sources were noncommunity
groundwater sources.
Chemicals. During 1999, two outbreaks involving chemical contamination were reported. A total of three persons were

affected by contamination of drinking water from nitrate and
sodium hydroxide.
Unidentified Etiologic Agents. Seventeen outbreaks
involving gastroenteritis of unknown etiology were reported
from four states, affecting an estimated 416 persons and
resulting in five hospitalizations. Testing for certain
enteric pathogens (including ova and parasite testing) was
attempted in five of the 17 outbreaks. In a June 2000
outbreak affecting 2 persons, stool specimens collected from
one person tested negative for G. intestinalis but positive for
Blastocystis hominis. However, whether B. hominis was the cause
of the reported illness is unclear, and the pathogenicity of
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TABLE 4. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by etiologic agent and type of water system — United
States, 1999–2000 (n = 39)

Etiologic agent
AGI†
Giardia intestinalis
Escherichia coli O157:H7
Norwalk-like viruses (NLV)
Salmonella species¶
Campylobacter jejuni
Es. coli O157:H7/Ca. jejuni
Small round-structured virus
Cryptosporidium parvum
Sodium hydroxide
Nitrate
Total
Percentage

Community
Outbreaks
Cases
6§
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
11
28.2

57
0
51
0
124
0
0
0
5
2
0
239
11.6

Type of water system*
Noncommunity
Outbreaks
Cases
3
2
0
3
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
11
28.2

164
39
0
356
0
15
781
70
0
0
0
1,425
68.9

Individual
Outbreaks
Cases
8
4
2
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
17
43.6

195
13
9
0
84
102
0
0
0
0
1
404
19.5

Total
Outbreaks
Cases
17
6
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
39
100.0

416
52
60
356
208
117
781
70
5
2
1
2,068
100.0

* Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/
year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park with >15 service connections or an
average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6
months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems
are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons. Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g.,
lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as
individual systems.
†
Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
§
One outbreak of four cases was caused by an unidentified chemical.
¶
One outbreak was serotype Typhimurium, and one outbreak was serotype Bareilly.

TABLE 5. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by type of deficiency and type of water system —
United States, 1999–2000 (n = 39)

Type of deficiency†
Untreated surface water
Untreated groundwater
Inadequate treatment
Distribution system
Miscellaneous or unknown
Total

Community
Outbreaks
%
0
1
5
5
0
11

0
9.0
45.5
45.5
0
100.0

Type of water system*
Noncommunity
Outbreaks
%
0
8
3
0
0
11

0
72.7
27.3
0
0
100.0

Individual
Outbreaks
%
1
8
1
1
6
17

5.9
47.0
5.9
5.9
35.3
100.0

Total
Outbreaks
1
17
9
6
6
39

%
2.6
43.6
23.1
15.4
15.4
100.0

* Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/
year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park with >15 service connections or an
average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6
months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, or parks). Individual water systems
are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons. Outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (e.g.,
lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other nonpotable sources with or without taps) are also classified as
individual systems.
†
Examples of treatment deficiencies include temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate disinfection, or inadequate or no filtration;
examples of distribution system deficiencies include cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction or repair, or contamination of a
storage facility; and examples of unknown or miscellaneous deficiencies include contaminated bottled water.

B. hominis has been debated in the scientific community (26).
Stool specimens were negative for parasitic and bacterial
enteric pathogens in two outbreaks in Washington (July 1999
and August 1999) and in two Florida outbreaks (March 1999
and April 2000) (Appendix A).
In addition, suspected pathogens were noted in four other
outbreak reports submitted. On the basis of symptoms of illness, Norwalk-like virus (NLV) was suspected in an Idaho
outbreak among firefighters that caused 65 illnesses and four
hospitalizations, but the outbreak was not laboratory-

confirmed. G. intestinalis was suspected in an April 2000 outbreak in a Florida trailer park affecting 21 persons, on the
basis of the incubation period and symptoms reported. In
another outbreak in a Florida trailer park in March 2000
among 19 persons, a bacterial pathogen was suspected as the
cause of the outbreak on the basis of the symptoms, which
included conjunctivitis and dermatitis in addition to gastroenteritis. A chemical agent was suspected as the cause of illness among four residents in a Florida apartment building
who had a cross-connection between their drinking water and
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toxins were not detected. Es. coli
O157:H7 was found in the water in
a July 2000 California outbreak. In
a 2000 Colorado outbreak, the presEtiologic agent (n = 39)
Water system (n = 39)
ence of G. intestinalis was demonUnidentified
Individual
strated in a sample from the water
43.6%
43.6%
holding tank, despite the lack of
Chemical
Bacterial
coliform data.
Community
5.1%
23.1%
Of the three outbreaks with either
28.2%
Noncommunity
Viral
a confirmed or suspected chemical
28.2%
10.3%
Parasitic
etiology, only one demonstrated that
17.9%
the chemical had been directly in the
water. Tap water was tested after the
Water source (n = 38)*
Deficiency (n = 39)
health department was notified that
Untreated
groundwater
an infant had methemoglobinemia.
43.6%
Well
Both fecal coliforms and 28 mg/L
68.4%
Treatment
Spring
Untreated surface
of nitrate were detected in the
deficiency
5.3%
water 2.6%
23.1%
water. For an outbreak where burns
Miscellaneous
Irrigation system
15.4%
and gastroenteritis were reported
7.9%
Distribution system
Surface water
and linked to a sodium hydroxide
15.4%
18.4%
spill, a pH test of the water that
could indicate whether NaOH or
* One outbreak of Salmonella Bareilly was not included.
another basic substance had spilled
into the water was not documented.
However, the environmental assessment indicated the tank
a toilet flush-valve. The residents of the apartment had noted
contents had emptied into the water. A third suspected chemiblue tap water before onset of illness on multiple occasions
cal outbreak involving a cross-connection between a toilet
before an improper flush valve in the toilet tank was discovered.
flush-valve and the drinking water system did not have waterFour outbreaks of gastroenteritis were associated with conquality data available.
sumption of untreated water from private wells. These four
In 11 of the 35 outbreaks, water was not sampled for
outbreaks occurred in Florida and affected 3–4 persons each.
coliforms
until >1 month after the first case associated with
In July 2000, flooding was a possible contributor to two outthe outbreak was reported (range: 5–16 weeks). In four of
breaks. Water in each of the homes tested positive for coliforms
these 11 outbreaks, the water samples did not test positive for
and did not have adequate disinfection.
coliforms (fecal or total), chemicals, or pathogens. Instead,
Water-Quality Data
these were confirmed as outbreaks by epidemiologic data or
Water-quality data (i.e., information regarding the presence
by reports that treatment deficiencies had occurred.
of coliform bacteria, pathogens, or chemical contaminants)
Water Systems and Water Sources
were available for 35 (89.7%) of the 39 drinking water outEleven (28.2%) of the 39 drinking water outbreaks were
breaks. Two reports of outbreaks of confirmed or suspected
associated
with community systems, 11 (28.2%) with noninfectious etiology and two reports of outbreaks of confirmed
community systems, and 17 (43.6%) with individual water
or suspected chemical etiology did not provide water-quality
systems (Tables 4 and 5). Ten (25.6%) of the 39 drinking
data.
water outbreaks were associated with surface water, including
Of the 36 reports of outbreaks with a suspected or conthree outbreaks that implicated irrigation water not intended
firmed infectious etiology, 33 outbreaks provided water-quality
for consumption. Twenty-nine (74.4%) of the 39 drinking
data. Twenty-six (78.8%) of the 33 outbreaks with a suspected
water outbreaks, including the outbreak associated with
or confirmed infectious etiology reported a positive coliform,
bottled water, were associated with groundwater sources (wells
total coliform, or fecal coliform result. Organisms also were
and springs).
detected in the water in two of these outbreaks. In August
Five (45.5%) of the 11 outbreaks associated with commu2000, Ca. jejuni was detected in the water in a mixed
nity water systems were caused by treatment deficiencies; one
Ca. jejuni/Es. coli O157:H7 outbreak in Utah, although shiga
FIGURE 2. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by etiologic agent,
water system, water source, and deficiency — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 39)
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(9.0%) outbreak was related to contaminated, untreated
groundwater, and five (45.5%) outbreaks were related to
problems in the water distribution system. Two of the five
distribution system problems were related to cross-connections
between the distribution system and an irrigation well. The
third outbreak related to a community water source had a
household cross-connection between the toilet water and main
kitchen tap. One outbreak of Cr. parvum (Florida, December
2000) was related to a repeated history of water main breaks.
In another outbreak in Ohio in August 2000, deficiencies in
the distribution system of a fairgrounds might have allowed
back-siphonage of animal manure into the water used by food
and beverage vendors.
Ten (90.1%) of 11 outbreaks associated with noncommunity water systems occurred in groundwater systems. Seven of
the 10 groundwater outbreaks were linked to untreated wells,
and one of the 10 involved consumption of untreated spring
water. Two of the 10 outbreaks were related to treatment
deficiencies in water taken from wells or a spring and
were associated with outbreaks of NLV and a small roundstructured virus. An outbreak associated with G. intestinalis
related to consumption of surface water occurred when a pump
failure and a defective filter cartridge resulted in river water
entering the drinking water holding tank without filtration.
No information concerning chlorine levels from water samples
was provided.
Nine (52.9%) of 17 outbreaks associated with individual
water systems occurred in groundwater systems. Eight of these
groundwater systems were wells that were not treated routinely; one outbreak of giardiasis occurred when the filtration
system for a well was inadvertently turned off. Five (31.3%)
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of the 16 outbreaks occurred when persons drank water not
intended for direct consumption from irrigation systems or
when they consumed surface water that had been ineffectively
or improperly treated. One (6.3%) of the 16 outbreaks in a
system occurred in a home where creek water on the property
was directly consumed without treatment.
Of the nine bacterial outbreaks, four occurred in groundwater systems (one was associated with a deficiency in the
distribution system, one with a treatment deficiency, and two
occurred in untreated systems). Six of seven parasitic outbreaks
occurred in groundwater systems: three occurred in untreated
systems; two involved problems in the distribution system;
and one was related to a treatment deficiency. All four viral
outbreaks occurred in noncommunity groundwater systems.
Two occurred in untreated wells, and two were related to treatment deficiencies in a spring and well. Two chemical outbreaks were related to treatment deficiencies in well water.
Fourteen of the 17 outbreaks of unknown etiology were linked
to groundwater systems. Ten of these 14 outbreaks occurred
in untreated systems; two were related to distribution system
problems, and two were related to treatment deficiencies.

Outbreaks Associated
with Recreational Water
During 1999–2000, a total of 23 states reported 59 outbreaks associated with recreational water (Tables 6–9)
(see Appendix B for selected case descriptions). Twenty-three
outbreaks were reported for 1999, and 36 for 2000. The states
that reported the largest number of outbreaks were Florida
(14 outbreaks) and Minnesota (eight outbreaks). These

TABLE 6. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with recreational water — United States, 1999 (n = 15)
State

Month

Class*

Etiologic agent

California
Connecticut
Florida
Florida

Jun
Jul
Mar
Aug

III
II
III
I

Florida
Florida
Idaho
Illinois
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Nebraska
New York
Washington
Wisconsin
Wisconsin

Aug
Sep
Jun
Jun
Jul
Jul
Jun
Jun
Aug
Jul
Aug

IV
III
IV
III
III
III
IV
II
I
IV
II

AGI†
Escherichia coli O121:H19
Campylobacter jejuni
Shigella sonnei,
Cryptosporidium parvum§
Cr. parvum
Es. coli O157:H7
Norwalk-like virus
AGI
Giardia intestinalis
Cr. parvum
Es. coli O157:H7
Norwalk-like virus
Es. coli O157:H7
Cr. parvum
Es. coli O157:H7

Illness

Number
of cases

Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis

23
11
6

Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis

38
6
2
25
25
18
10
7
168
36
10
5

Source
Pool
Lake
Pool
Interactive
fountain
Pool
Ditch water
Hot springs
Lake
Pond
Pool
Wading pool
Lake
Lake
Pool
Lake/pond

* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
†
Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
§
Five persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Shigella sonnei; two stools tested positive for Cryptosporidium parvum.

Setting
Apartment complex
Lake
Private home
Beach park
Private home
Community
Resort
Lake
Pond
Trailer park
Child care center
County park
State park
Municipal pool
Swimming beach
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TABLE 7. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with recreational water — United States, 2000 (n = 21)
State
Colorado
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Maine
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
Ohio
South Carolina
Wisconsin

Month

Class*

Aug
May
Jul
Jul
Aug
Aug
Aug
Aug
Jun
Jul
Jul
Jul
Jul
Jul
Aug
Aug
Sep
Jun
Jun
Jul
Jan

I
IV
III
III
III
I
III
III
II
II
II
IV
III
II
II
IV
III
I
I
IV
IV

Etiologic agent

Cryptosporidium parvum
AGI†
AGI
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
AGI
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
AGI
Cr. parvum¶
Shigella sonnei**
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Sh. sonnei
Cr. parvum
Shigella flexneri
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Cr. parvum
Norwalk-like virus

Illness
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis

Number
of cases
112
2
4
3
5
19
9
5
36
32
220
15
7
6
25
4
6
225
700
26
9

Source
Pool
Lake
Outdoor spring
Pool
Pool
Pool
Pool
Pool
Pools§
Lake/pond
Lake
Lake/pond
Pool
Pool
Lake
Pool
Wading pool
Pools
Pool
Pool
Pool

Setting
Municipal pool
Lake
County park
Apartment complex
Country club
Resort
Motel
Condominium
Community
Swimming beach
Swimming beach
Swimming beach
Day camp
Hotel
Public beach
Municipal pool
Community
Community
Private swim club
Community
Motel

* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
§ Persons swam in a community pool and an inflatable pool.
¶ Seventeen persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Cr. parvum. One person had a stool specimen that tested positive for Giardia intestinalis.
One person had a stool specimen that tested positive for both organisms.
** Fourteen of 15 stool specimens tested positive for Shigella; one person tested positive for Cr. parvum; and one tested positive for both.
†

TABLE 8. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of meningoencephalitis, keratitis, leptospirosis, and Pontiac fever associated with
recreational water — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 8)
State

Year

Month

Class*

California
Florida
Florida
Guam
Vermont
Texas
Texas
Wisconsin

2000
1999
2000
2000
2000
1999
2000
2000

Apr
Oct
—§
Jul
Feb
Sep
Jul
May

NA†
NA
NA
II
NA
II
NA
I

Etiologic agent

Naegleria fowleri
N. fowleri
N. fowleri
Leptospira interrogans
Bromine
Unknown¶
N. fowleri
Legionella pneumophila

Illness
Meningoencephalitis
Meningoencephalitis
Meningoencephalitis
Leptospirosis
Chemical keratitis
Acute respiratory infection
Meningoencephalitis
Pontiac fever

Number
of cases

Source

Setting

1
1
1
21
3
12
1
20

Mudhole
Pond
—
Lake
Pool
Hot tub
Lake
Whirlpool

Mudhole
Pond
—
Adventure race
Pool
Ranch
Lake
Motel

* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
†
Not applicable.
§
The month the outbreak occurred was not reported; the source and setting were not reported.
¶
Clinical specimens tested negative for Legionella pneumophila serotypes 1 and 6, adenovirus, influenza virus, and parainfluenza virus.

59 outbreaks affected 2,093 persons and resulted in 25 hospitalizations and four deaths. The median size of the outbreak
was 10 persons (range: 1–700).
Of the 59 outbreaks, 36 were outbreaks of gastroenteritis
(Tables 6 and 7); 15 were outbreaks of dermatitis (Table 9);
four were cases of meningoencephalitis; and the remaining
four outbreaks were of leptospirosis, chemical keratitis, acute
respiratory infection of unknown etiology, and Pontiac fever
(Table 8). Thirty-one (86.1%) of the 36 outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis occurred during the summer months (i.e., June–
August) (Figure 3). Outbreaks of dermatitis associated with

recreational water contact were reported more frequently in
February, March, June, and July. The four cases of primary
amebic meningoencephalitis occurred in the warmer months
(April–October).
Etiologic Agents
Of the 59 recreational water outbreaks, 44 (74.6%) were of
known infectious etiology (Tables 6–9). Of the 36 outbreaks
involving gastroenteritis, 17 (47.2%) were caused by parasites; nine (25.0%) by bacteria; three (8.3%) by viruses; one
(2.8%) by a combination of parasites and bacteria; and the
remaining six (16.7%) were of unknown etiology (Figure 4).
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TABLE 9. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of dermatitis associated with recreational water — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 15)
State

Year

Month

Alaska
Arkansas
Arkansas
California
California
Colorado
Colorado
Florida
Maine
Maine
Minnesota
Oregon
Vermont
Vermont
Washington

2000
1999
2000
2000
2000
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
1999
1999
1999
2000

Oct
Jun
Feb
Jun
Jul
Feb
Dec
Aug
Feb
Mar
Dec
Jul
Jun
Feb
Mar

Class*

Etiologic agent

NA†
NA
NA
IV
IV
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
IV
NA
NA
NA

Pseudomonas aeruginosa§
P. aeruginosa§
P. aeruginosa§
Schistosomes**
Schistosomes**
P. aeruginosa¶§
P. aeruginosa††
P. aeruginosa††
P. aeruginosa¶
P. aeruginosa§
P. aeruginosa¶
Schistosomes**
P. aeruginosa††
P. aeruginosa††
P. aeruginosa††

Number
of cases
29
10
26
6
4
19
5
6
9
11
16
2
9
11
10

Source
Pool/hot tub
Pool
Pool/ hot tub
Pond
Pond
Hot tub
Hot tub
Hot tub
Hot tub/pool
Hot tub
Hot tub
Lake
Hot tub
Hot tub
Pool/hot tub

Setting
Hotel
Community
Motel
Pond
Pond
Hotel
Ski lodge
Apartment complex
Hotel
Hotel
Private
Lake
Hotel
Vacation home
Motel

* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
Not applicable.
§ Organism isolated from water.
¶ Laboratory-confirmed case.
** Suspected etiology on the basis of clinical syndrome and setting.
†† Suspected etiology on the basis of clinical syndrome.
†

FIGURE 3. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks
associated with recreational water, by illness and month —
United States, 1999–2000 (n = 58)*
18

Number of outbreaks

16

Other
Meningoencephalitis
Dermatitis
Gastroenteritis

14
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8
6
4
2
0
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Mar

Apr
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1999–2000

* Information regarding the month was not provided for one outbreak of
meningoencephalitis.

Of the 23 nongastroenteritis-related recreational outbreaks,
seven were attributed to P. aeruginosa, four to free-living amoebae, one to Leptospira species, one to Legionella species, and
one to bromine (Tables 8 and 9). Nine nongastroenteritisrelated recreational outbreaks were of unknown etiology, eight
of which were suspected but not confirmed to be caused by
P. aeruginosa or schistosomes. The ninth outbreak of unknown
etiology was suspected to be caused by a virus or by Legionella
pneumophila on the basis of observed symptoms and the epidemiologically implicated vehicle of transmission. Of the 59
recreational water outbreaks, 21 (35.6%) were associated with

fresh or surface water, and 37 (62.7%) with treated (e.g., chlorinated) water. Information regarding the water venue for an
outbreak of meningoencephalitis was not provided.
Parasites. Sixteen of the 17 parasitic recreational water outbreaks involving gastroenteritis were caused by Cr. parvum.
The seventeenth outbreak was caused by G. intestinalis.
Fifteen of the 17 parasitic outbreaks occurred in chlorinated
venues; in these outbreaks, inadequate treatment, disrupted
chlorine disinfection, or suboptimal pool maintenance were
contributing factors to the outbreaks. Cr. parvum is highly
resistant to chlorine disinfection and can survive for days in
adequately chlorinated pools; therefore, suboptimal chlorination of the pool might not be the sole factor contributing
to the occurrence of an outbreak.
Three outbreaks of laboratory-confirmed cryptosporidiosis
occurred during the 1999 summer swim season. During the
2000 summer swim season, three substantial outbreaks of
Cr. parvum occurred that were related to swimming in
municipal pools. In August 2000, an outbreak occurred in
Colorado that affected 112 persons attending a private pool
party. In June 2000, the two other cryptosporidiosis outbreaks,
one in Ohio affecting 700 persons and the other in Nebraska
affecting 225 persons (27), occurred among members of private swim clubs. In both outbreaks, the protracted nature of
the outbreaks during >2 months was the result of repeated
recontamination of the pools by infected persons continuing
to swim; 37 (18%) of 205 persons interviewed in the
Nebraska outbreak admitted to swimming while symptomatic, and 32% swam while ill or during the 2 weeks after their
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FIGURE 4. Waterborne-disease outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with recreational
water, by etiologic agent and type of exposure — United States, 1999–2000

15

who had visited the same swimming
beach. After a review of potential risk
factors, the only common link found
Etiologic agent (n = 36)
Type of exposure (n = 36)
was swimming at the implicated
Cryptosporidium
beach. The popular beach
parvum 44.4%
featured a shallow, dammed area that
Treated water
61.1%
AGI*
was used for wading. Total and fecal
Shigella species
16.7%
coliforms were detected in water
8.3%
NLV†
samples collected before and during
Escherichia coli
Fresh water
8.3%
O157:H7
38.9%
Other§
the outbreak, although the levels
11.1%
11.1%
detected did not exceed levels of
Etiologic agent in treated water (n = 22)
Etiologic agent in fresh water (n = 14)
EPA-recommended guidelines for
Escherichia coli
microbiologic quality of water (22).
AGI*
Cryptosporidium
O157:H7
28.6%
68.2%
parvum
One
sample that was tested for
21.4%
Shigella
/
Es.
coli
O157:H7 was negative.
Cryptosporidium 4.5%
Cryptosporidium
NLV
parvum 7.1%
Escherichia coli
Es. coli O157:H7 was implicated in
14.3%
O157:H7 4.5%
another outbreak among 36 persons
Giardia 7.1%
Campylobacter jejuni
4.5%
(August 1999) who visited a state park
Escherichia coli
. NLV† AGI*
Shigella species
Shigella. species
O121:H19
14.3%
in Washington. Es. coli O121:H19 was
4.5%
4.5% 9.1%
7.1%
implicated in an outbreak in a Connecticut community (July 2000).
* Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
†
Shigella sonnei was implicated in two
Norwalk-like virus.
§
These included outbreaks of Campylobacter jejuni, Giardia, Escherichia coli O121:H19 and one mixed outbreaks that occurred at swimming
Shigella/Cryptosporidium outbreak.
beaches in Minnesota (July and
August 2000).
Nonfreshwater
sources
were implicated in four bacterial
illness (27). Another outbreak (Florida, August 2000) was
recreational
water
outbreaks
involving gastroenteritis. In
associated with the outbreak that occurred in Ohio. A family
March
1999,
an
outbreak
of
Ca.
jejuni was associated with a
who were members of the implicated swim club in the Ohio
private pool in Florida that did not have continuous chlorine
outbreak were vacationing with a sick child. While in a pool
disinfection and reportedly had ducks swimming in the pool.
in Florida, the infant had two fecal accidents. The resulting
Outbreaks of Shigella flexneri and Es. coli O157:H7 (Misoutbreak caused five cases of diarrheal illness and two hospisouri, September 2000 and Nebraska, June 1999) occurred
talizations.
among children using unchlorinated wading pools. Fecal
Eight other outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis occurred in
accidents were factors contributing to the contamination of
treated venues during the 2000 swim season. Two outbreaks
the water in both outbreaks. Es. coli O157:H7 also was impliof gastroenteritis occurred in untreated venues: one in a freshcated as a cause of illness in an outbreak (Florida, September
water lake in Minnesota in July 2000 and one in a Massachu1999) among two young children who had been playing in
setts pond in July 1999 (Appendix B).
ditch water. Both clinical specimens and water samples tested
Four cases of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic menpositive for Es. coli O157:H7.
ingoencephalitis attributed to Naegleria fowleri occurred durTwo nongastroenteritis-related recreational water outbreaks
ing this 2-year reporting period. All four persons were aged
were also reported. One outbreak of leptospirosis was reported
<19 years. Three of the persons died from infection after havamong 21 persons who participated in an adventure race in
ing contact with a pond, lake, or mud hole. The fourth person’s
Guam in July 2000 (Table 8). These persons reported mulfreshwater exposure could not be determined; that person had
tiple outdoor exposures, including running through jungles
fallen from a jet ski into an unspecified body of water, susand savannahs, swimming in a river and a reservoir, and bicytained injuries, and died from an infection shortly after it was
cling and kayaking in the ocean. Leptospira was confirmed by
detected.
serology, and an epidemiologic investigation demonstrated
Bacteria. Nine recreational outbreaks involving gastroenthat swimming in the reservoir, submerging one’s head in the
teritis were attributed to bacterial pathogens, and five of the
water, and swallowing water while swimming were risk facnine were linked to freshwater sources. Five cases (Wisconsin,
tors for illness. Water samples were not tested, and an
August 1999) of Es. coli O157:H7 occurred among persons
†
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environmental assessment of the reservoir was not conducted.
The second nongastroenteritis-related recreational water outbreak was an outbreak of Pontiac fever epidemiologically
linked to use of a whirlpool at a hotel.
Viruses. During 1999–2000, three outbreaks of NLV
(Calicivirus) that affected a total of 202 persons were reported.
Two NLV outbreaks occurred in untreated systems; one outbreak of NLV occurred (Idaho, June 1999) at a resort and
water park and affected 25 persons. The pool implicated in
the investigation was untreated because the source of the pool’s
water was a natural hot springs that was high in mineral content. The investigators noted that geothermal pools used for
swimming are not required to be regulated by public health
officials in that locale. The pool implicated by the
investigation also had been implicated in a previous outbreak
of NLV in June 1996.
Other. During 1999–2000, six recreational water outbreaks
involving gastroenteritis of unknown etiology were reported.
One outbreak (Florida, August) involved a motel pool that
was cloudy and dirty at the time of exposure. Nine persons
who swam in this pool and did not share any other common
exposure became ill with gastroenteritis. Disinfectant residuals and operation of the filtration system at the time of the
investigation were deficient. Problems were also noted with
the equipment used for adjusting pH.
Another outbreak (Florida, August 1999) among 38 persons who visited a beach park was attributed to both Sh. sonnei
and Cr. parvum (28). Illness was epidemiologically linked to
playing in an interactive fountain at the park, ingesting water,
and consuming food and beverages at the fountain. The
fountain’s recirculation, filtration, and disinfection systems
were not approved by the health department and were inadequate or not completely operational at the time of its use.
Samples of the fountain water tested positive for coliforms
but did not test positive for fecal coliforms. Nevertheless, the
cause of the outbreak was determined to be the fountain, which
was closed until the health department’s concerns could be
remedied.
Three cases of chemical keratitis (Vermont, February 2000)
resulted from exposure to bromine in a hotel swimming pool.
Bromine levels were >5 ppm (acceptable bromine levels are
1–3 ppm), and the pH level was >8.5. Patrons who spent
time with their heads underwater with their eyes open were
affected.
Twelve persons affected in an outbreak (Texas, September
1999) reported symptoms that included exhaustion, sore
muscles, headache, chills, and fever after attending a conference at a guest ranch. One woman reported a miscarriage
during her illness. Exposure to a hot tub, defined as either
immersion or being near the hot tub, was associated with
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illness. Although clinical specimens (urine, blood, sputum,
and throat swabs) were tested for organisms, including
Leg. pneumophila serogroups 1 and 6, influenza virus, parainfluenza virus, and adenovirus, no infectious agent was identified. No testing for biologic or chemical agents was performed
on water samples because the hot tub had already been drained,
refilled, and hyperchlorinated before the environmental
investigation.
During the 1999–2000 reporting period, 15 outbreaks of
dermatitis were identified (Table 9). Three of these outbreaks
were associated with swimming in freshwater and were
assumed to be cercarial dermatitis caused by contact with the
larval form (cercariae) of schistosomes, which are present in
freshwater environments. Two of these dermatitis outbreaks
occurred in lakes in California that were associated with past
cases of cercarial dermatitis. The onset of dermatitis occurred
within hours after swimming in the lake and resolved after a
limited number of days (median days of illness were 2 and 3
days [range: 2–3 and 3–5 days], respectively). The 12 remaining outbreaks were associated with pool and hot tub use and
affected 5–29 persons each. P. aeruginosa was confirmed in
clinical isolates in 3 of the 12 outbreaks and was confirmed
in water/filter samples in five outbreaks, two of which also
had a clinical isolate. In eight of these outbreaks of dermatitis, specific treatment deficiencies or problems were identified. Outbreaks in Arkansas (June 1999), Florida (August
2000), Colorado (December 1999), and Washington (March
2000) were attributed to deficiencies in treatment.
In one outbreak of dermatitis (Maine, February 2000), nine
persons reported rash in addition to headache, fever, fatigue,
and sore throat (29). Swimming in the hot tub or swimming
in the pool was a risk factor. The pool and hot tub were on
separate filtration systems, and both were used by the majority of persons in the outbreak. Low levels of free chlorine were
found in the pool and hot tub, but the presence of chlorinate
isocyanurates (chlorine stabilizers) might have influenced
measured levels of free chlorine. A clinical isolate of P. eruginosa
was obtained from an ill person; P. aeruginosa also was isolated
from the pool filter even after the pool had been cleaned twice.
P. aeruginosa was isolated from clinical specimens and
water samples in an outbreak at a Colorado hotel that
affected 19 persons in February 1999 (28), 13 of whom were
children aged <15 years. Symptoms were not limited to rash;
they included diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, fever, fatigue, muscle
aches, joint pain, swollen lymph nodes, and subcutaneous
nodules on hands and feet. Because of the severity and range
of symptoms, clinical specimens were examined for enteric
bacterial and parasitic pathogens as well as Legionella species,
Leptospira species, and Entamoeba histolytica but did not test
positive for any of these etiologic agents. Swabs taken from
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the hot tub floor and rail were positive for P. aeruginosa and
other Pseudomonas species. Pool and hot tub records indicated
that chlorine and pH had declined below the state-mandated
levels at the time of exposure. Epidemiologic evidence implicated the hot tub as the likely vehicle of exposure for the outbreak. In both the Colorado outbreak and the Maine outbreak
that occurred in February 2000, an offsite contractor had been
engaged to monitor disinfectant and pH levels. Insufficient
communication between pool staff and the remote monitoring company might have contributed to extended periods of
usage with inadequate disinfection (28).
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An outbreak of acute respiratory illness occurred among
sugar beet processing plant workers (Minnesota, August 2000).
Of the 15 cases identified, 13 were hospitalized. Serology for
4 (26.7%) of the 15 persons tested positive for Leg.
pneumophila; three (20.0%) persons were confirmed positive
for Leg. pneumophila by sputum polymerase chain reaction
(PCR). Fourteen (93.3%) of the 15 persons worked on a crew
that had performed high-pressure cleaning in one area of the
plant; the fifteenth patient had conducted high-pressure cleaning elsewhere in the plant. The sources of water for the highpressure cleaning contained 105 colony-forming unit (CFU)/
mL of Leg. pneumophila and endotoxin levels of 22,200
endotoxin units/mL. Although the attack rate, symptoms, and
laboratory findings were consistent with an outbreak of Pontiac
fever, endotoxin exposure might have contributed to this
outbreak.

Outbreaks Associated with Occupational
Exposure to Water
Two outbreaks not associated with drinking or recreational
water exposure were reported during this period (Table 10).
One outbreak of leptospirosis (Hawaii, August 1999) occurred
among persons landscaping a pond. Leptospirosis was confirmed serologically for the two persons who had contact with
the pond. Both persons reported multiple skin abrasions and
were exposed to the pond water for a period of 5–10 days.
One of the two persons was hospitalized.

Previously Unreported Outbreaks
Three previously unreported drinking water outbreaks that
occurred in 1995 and 1997 were submitted during this
reporting period (Table 11). An illegal cross-connection
(Washington, July 1995) between a domestic water supply

TABLE 10. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with occupational exposures — United States, 1999–2000 (n = 2)
State

Year

Month

Class*

Etiologic agent

Hawaii
Minnesota

1999
2000

Aug
Aug

IV
III

Leptospira
Pontiac fever†

Exposure

Number
of cases

Source

2
15

Pond
Plant lagoon

Contact with pond water
High-pressure cleaning
using lagoon water

Setting
Outdoor landscaping
Sugar beet plant

* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
†
Endotoxin was also isolated from environmental samples; the role of endotoxin is unclear.

TABLE 11. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water that were not included in the previous surveillance
summaries — United States, 1995–1997 (n = 3)*
State

Year

Month

Class*

Etiologic agent

Washington
California
New York

1995
1997
1997

Jul
Nov
Dec

III
III
I

Giardia intestinalis**
Nitrite (sodium metaborite)
Norwalk-like virus

Number
of cases
87
7
1,450

Type of
system§ Deficiency¶
Com
Com
Ncom

4
4
3

Source

Setting

Well
Community
Mixed river/groundwater Hospital cafeteria
Well
Ski resort

* An outbreak is defined as 1) >2 persons experiencing a similar illness after either ingestion of drinking water or exposure to water used for recreational
purposes and 2) epidemiologic evidence that implicates water as the probable source of illness.
† On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12.
§ Com = community; Ncom = noncommunity; Ind = individual; Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that serve >15
connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or
mobile home park with >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents. A noncommunity water system can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient
systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., factories or schools), whereas transient systems do not (e.g., restaurants, highway rest
stations, or parks). Individual water systems are not owned or operated by a water utility and serve <15 connections or <25 persons. Outbreaks associated
with water not intended for drinking (e.g., lakes, springs, and creeks used by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other nonpotable sources with or
without taps) are also classified as individual systems.
¶ 1 = untreated surface water; 2 = untreated groundwater; 3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate
disinfection, and inadequate or no filtration); 4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., cross-connection, contamination of water mains during construction
or repair, and contamination of a storage facility); and 5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency (e.g., contaminated bottled water).
** Thirty-three persons had stool specimens that tested positive for G. intestinalis. One specimen tested positive for Entamoeba coli. One other specimen
tested positive for Blastocystis hominis. One cultured specimen tested positive for Campylobacter jejuni.
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and an irrigation system at a plant nursery resulted in contamination of multiple wells in a community. Eighty-seven
cases of gastroenteritis were reported, and one hospitalization
was recorded. G. intestinalis was determined in 33 (52.4%) of
63 stool specimens; Entamoeba coli and B. hominis were each
found in one stool specimen. One (7.1%) of 14 stool specimens that were cultured for Ca. jejuni tested positive.
NLV was implicated as the cause of an outbreak (New York,
December 1997) of 1,450 cases at a restaurant at a ski resort.
Epidemiologic data implicated water or consumption of ice
made from water as the cause of the outbreak. The environmental assessment revealed possible problems with the well
operation and location. The chlorinator for the well had been
malfunctioning and had already been disconnected before the
assessment. Testing of the water by the local health department determined that neither a free nor total chlorine residual
was detectable in the potable water supply and indicated the
presence of fecal coliforms. In addition, the well was located
<24 inches away from a stream. During the period the chlorinator was not functioning, the pump for the well had been
continuously pumping water. Surface water that might have
been introduced into the water supply, plus a deficiency in
treatment of the water, played a key role in the outbreak.
Seven persons who were either employees or visitors at a
hospital (California, November 1997) were symptomatic for
methemoglobinemia in one outbreak. An epidemiologic
investigation indicated that the only shared exposure among
these persons was a visit to the hospital cafeteria and the consumption of a carbonated beverage with ice from the selfservice soda dispenser. The onset of symptoms occurred 1–5
minutes after or while drinking a carbonated beverage. One
person was hospitalized, and no deaths occurred. The environmental investigation discovered a cross-connection in the
plumbing system that might have allowed water from the cooling tower, which had been recently shock-treated with
sodium metaborate, to be drawn into the drinking water system. Sodium metaborate has been associated with nitrate poisoning and methemoglobinemia in past incidents (30).

Outbreaks Not Classified as WBDOs
Outbreaks attributed to drinking water that was contaminated or potentially contaminated at the point of use rather
than at the source or in the distribution system are not classified as WBDOs. Six outbreaks, causing illness among a total
of 102 persons, are in this category. None of the six outbreaks
reflected a common vehicle of contamination: one outbreak
of Cr. parvum was epidemiologically associated with ice consumption; a school-based outbreak of Sh. sonnei was related
to consumption of water from a dispenser stored in a
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bathroom facility; a third outbreak involved water taken from
a garden hose (the water had been stored in an ice chest
before consumption at a private residence); and a fourth outbreak associated with bottled water that might have been contaminated at the point of use. Two of the six reported
point-of-use outbreaks involving a suspected chemical exposure occurred in food service facilities, but water testing was
not performed to verify the presence of the chemical; and,
because of the relatively limited number of cases associated
with these incidents, the epidemiologic information was not
adequate to include these incidents as outbreaks.
Data from six other possible or confirmed outbreaks were
also not included in this analysis. One confirmed outbreak of
leptospirosis was related to travel outside the United States or
its territories and therefore was excluded. This outbreak
occurred among student travelers who became ill after their
return from Ecuador. Three cases of leptospirosis were confirmed by laboratory testing among the cohort, and four
additional cases were suspected. Three other outbreaks of
G. intestinalis, Cr. parvum, and NLV could not be included
in the analysis. Although these outbreaks were probably caused
by a recreational water exposure, the data provided did not
meet the criteria for inclusion (i.e., the outbreaks did not meet
the criteria for Classes I–IV).
Two additional outbreaks were excluded because of inadequate information: one outbreak of dermatitis caused by
in-home bathing and one potential drinking water outbreak
of Cr. parvum in a New England community. This outbreak
of Cr. parvum occurred in a community near another reported
community outbreak of G. intestinalis and Cr. parvum in 1999.
The pond implicated in the recreational water outbreak of
G. intestinalis also served as a surface water source, which was
intermittently mixed into the municipal drinking water that
supplied the community. However, not all the persons received
their drinking water from the municipal water source.
Although raw surface water samples later tested positive for
Cr. parvum by immunomagnetic spectroscopy (IMS), household water samples either tested negative, were not tested, or
the results were not provided. The epidemiologic information and water-quality information provided were not conclusive.

Discussion
Considerations Regarding Reported
Results
The WBDO surveillance system provides information concerning epidemiologic and etiologic trends in outbreaks. In

Vol. 51 / SS-8

Surveillance Summaries

19

Number of outbreaks

Number of outbreaks

previous years, a decrease in the number of drinking waterwhere the majority of outbreaks actually occurred. An increase
associated outbreaks had been observed. However, the
in the number of outbreaks reported could either reflect an
actual increase in outbreaks or an improved sensitivity in
cumulative number of drinking water outbreaks reported for
surveillance practices.
the 1999–2000 period demonstrates a reversal of this trend
Recognition of WBDOs also is dependent on certain out(Figures 5 and 6). The number of recreational water outbreaks
break characteristics; outbreaks associated with serious illness
has been gradually increasing for the past 15 years and is at
or affecting a substantial number of persons are more likely
the highest level since CDC began receiving such reports in
to receive attention from health authorities. Outbreaks
1978.
involving acute diseases, including those characterized by a
Although the number of outbreaks reported through
the surveillance system has
increased, the significance of this FIGURE 5. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by
increase is unclear. Whether this year and etiologic agent — United States, 1971–2000 (n = 730)*
indeed reflects a true increase in the
60
number of outbreaks that occurred
†
in the United States is unknown.
AGI
Not all outbreaks are recognized,
Chemical
50
Viral
investigated, and then reported to
Parasitic
CDC or EPA, and studies have not
40
Bacterial
been performed that assess the sensitivity of this system and indicate
30
what percentage of actual outbreaks this system is able to detect.
20
Multiple factors exist that can
influence whether WBDOs are
10
recognized and investigated by
local, territorial, and state public
0
health agencies: the size of the out1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
break; severity of disease caused by
Year
the outbreak; public awareness of
the outbreak; routine laboratory *† The total from previous reports has been corrected from n = 691 to n = 688.
Acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.
testing for organisms; requirements for reporting cases of diseases; and resources available to the FIGURE 6. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water, by
year and type of water system — United States, 1971–2000 (n = 730)*
local health departments for surveillance and investigation of prob60
Individual
able outbreaks. This surveillance
Noncommunity
50
system probably underreports the
Community
true number of outbreaks because
40
of the multiple steps required
before an outbreak is identified
30
and investigated. In addition,
changes in the capacity of local,
20
county, and state public health
10
agencies and laboratories to detect
an outbreak might influence the
0
numbers of outbreaks reported in
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
each state relative to other states.
The states with the majority of
Year
outbreaks reported during this
period might not be the states * The total from previous reports has been corrected from n = 691 to n = 688.
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short incubation period, are more readily identified than
outbreaks associated with chronic, low-level exposure to an
agent (e.g., certain chemicals) or are associated with organisms that have a longer incubation period (e.g., certain parasitic organisms). Outbreaks involving larger drinking water
systems (e.g., community systems) are more likely to be
detected than outbreaks that involve noncommunity systems
because these systems serve mostly nonresidential areas and
transient populations. Outbreaks associated with individual
systems are the most likely to be underreported because they
typically involve a limited number of persons. Recreational
outbreaks where persons congregate in one venue and then
are geographically dispersed can be difficult to document.
The identification of the etiologic agent of a WBDO
depends on the timely recognition of the outbreak so that
appropriate clinical and environmental samples can be collected. The laboratory involved in the testing of specimens
must have the capacity and capability to test for a particular
organism. In certain cases, specific tests must be requested.
Routine testing of stool specimens at laboratories will include
tests for the presence of enteric bacterial pathogens and might
also include an ova and parasite examination. However,
Cr. parvum, one of the most commonly reported waterborne
parasites, is not often included in standard ova and parasite
examinations and in certain instances, must be specifically
requested (31). During 1999–2000, tests for NLV and other
possible agents of viral origin were rarely performed or documented in the outbreaks that were reported to CDC. Collection of water-quality data depends primarily on local and state
statutory requirements, the availability of investigative personnel, and the technical capacity of the laboratories that test
the water. Furthermore, certain outbreaks can substantially
alter the relative proportion of cases of waterborne disease
attributed to a particular agent. The number of reported cases
is typically an approximate figure, and the method and accuracy of the approximation vary among outbreaks.
One key limitation of the data collected as part of the
WBDO surveillance system is that the information collected
pertains only to outbreaks of waterborne illness. The epidemiologic trends and water-quality concerns observed in outbreaks might not necessarily reflect or correspond with trends
associated with endemic waterborne illness. CDC and EPA
are collaborating on a series of epidemiologic studies to assess
the magnitude of nonoutbreak waterborne illness associated
with consumption of municipal drinking water and with
exposure to recreational marine and freshwaters.
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Outbreaks Associated with Drinking
Water
The number of outbreaks reported during 1999 (15) and
2000 (24) is higher than the number reported during 1997
(7) and 1998 (10). As described previously, the number of
drinking water outbreaks had declined (2,3). The increase in
reported outbreaks should be carefully interpreted. Although
the number of drinking water outbreaks has changed, the
total number of persons affected by a drinking water outbreak during 1999–2000 (n = 2,027) is comparable to what
was initially reported in 1997–1998 (n = 2,038) and 1995–
1996 (n = 2,567) (2,3). Changes in surveillance and reporting of outbreaks might have improved detection of outbreaks
affecting limited, private systems that in turn, affect a relatively limited number of persons. However, the increase in
outbreaks that affect persons in limited, private systems merits further investigation by public health and water-quality
agencies.
Certain states reported drinking water outbreaks for the
first time in >10 years (e.g., Connecticut since 1976 or Utah
since 1986). California reported multiple drinking water outbreaks after reporting no outbreaks in 1997 and 1998, and
compared with other years during 1990–2000, the number
of reported outbreaks in California increased slightly. The
number of outbreaks reported by Florida also increased.
Although the numbers of reported outbreaks increased overall, the seasonality of the drinking water outbreaks is consistent with previous years, with the number peaking during the
summer months. The observed increase in the number of outbreaks is associated with an increase in outbreaks associated
with consumption of untreated water from both surface and
groundwater sources, but specifically private wells.
The percentage of drinking water outbreaks associated with
surface water during 1999–2000 was 17.9% (i.e., seven outbreaks) (Figure 2). This percentage is higher than the 11.8%
reported during 1997–1998 period (i.e., two outbreaks).
However, three of the seven surface water outbreaks reported
during 1999–2000 were associated with the direct ingestion
of surface water without any treatment or with inadequate
individual treatment. Two of these outbreaks were associated
with consumption of water during outdoor excursions where
point-of-use treatment (e.g., filtration or disinfection) might
have been attempted and was either inadequate to protect
health or was inconsistently or incorrectly applied. The third
outbreak occurred after a household had run out of potable
water and instead served untreated creek water to their guests.
These three outbreaks illustrate that the public might be
unaware that surface water, despite its clarity, is prone to
contamination by organisms. Surface waters should not be

Vol. 51 / SS-8

Surveillance Summaries

directly consumed without being treated at the point of use
or boiled. Manufacturers of point-of-use devices and the
National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) provide information
regarding different devices, instructions for use, and their
ability to make water safe for human consumption.¶ The
remaining four outbreaks comprise approximately 11% of all
drinking water outbreaks, an equivalent percentage to that
reported in 1997–1998. These four outbreaks were associated with systems that routinely received treatment. One outbreak of giardiasis occurred at a resort (Colorado, August 2000)
served by a noncommunity system. The increased demand
for water during the summer, coupled with multiple treatment failures, resulted in the delivery of unfiltered and
nondisinfected water to the resort. These multiple failures
illustrate the importance of routine maintenance, specifically
among noncommunity systems, which do not have consistent demand for water year-round. Two outbreaks (Florida,
March 1999 and August 1999) were associated with crossconnections: one to an irrigation well and another to a toilet.
Another surface water outbreak (Ohio, August 2000) at a fairgrounds was suspected to have resulted from back-siphonage
into the drinking water from an animal manure site. These
outbreaks indicate that even when treatment of water at the
source is adequate, deficiencies in the distribution system or
at the home can result in illness. Such deficiencies are preventable, and the public should be informed of how to detect
and avoid creating cross-connections.
Twenty-eight (71.8%) of the 39 outbreaks related to drinking water were associated with groundwater sources. This
number is an 87% increase from the number reported in the
previous period (i.e., 15). Seventeen of the 28 outbreaks
(60.7%) were linked to consumption of untreated groundwater; eight of 28 (28.6%) outbreaks were associated with
treatment deficiencies; and three (10.7%) were linked to
deficiencies in the distribution system. The observed pattern
of deficiencies is contrary to what was observed in the previous reporting period, where the majority of groundwater outbreaks were associated with treatment or distribution system
problems. This pattern indicates that untreated groundwater
systems are increasingly associated with outbreaks of illness.
Groundwater systems, with the exception of systems influenced by surface water, are not routinely required to use filtration or treatment that would be expected to reduce the
number of pathogens in the water. EPA’s pending GWR** is
expected to establish multiple barriers in groundwater systems to protect against bacteria and viruses in drinking water

from groundwater sources and should establish a targeted
strategy to identify groundwater systems at high risk for fecal
contamination.
Twenty-six of these 28 groundwater outbreaks had a well as
the implicated water source, and two were linked to a spring.
The percentages of outbreaks associated with wells and springs
were similar during this reporting period to the 1997–1998
period. Although GWR is expected to have public health benefits, these protections extend primarily to community groundwater systems. Of the 26 well-related outbreaks that occurred
during the 1999–2000 period, only eight of 26 were associated with community wells. Ten were associated with individual private wells, and eight were associated with
noncommunity wells. These systems would not necessarily
benefit from the promulgation of GWR, and therefore, the
quality of water in wells remains a public health concern.
Approximately 14–15 million households in the United States
rely on a private, household well for drinking water each year,
and >90,000 new wells are drilled throughout the United States
each year (32). In addition, contamination of a private well is
not only a health concern for the household served by the
well, but can impact households using other nearby water
supplies and could potentially contaminate the aquifer.††
Additional education efforts should be targeted towards well
owners, users, well drillers, and local and state drinking water
personnel to encourage practices that best ensure safe drinking water for private well users.
Three outbreaks were associated with direct consumption
of water from irrigation systems, comprising approximately
8% of drinking water outbreaks (Figure 2). Cross-connections
to irrigation systems were implicated as contaminating factors in three other irrigation-related outbreaks. Irrigation
waters are not regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act,
because they are typically intended for agricultural purposes,
not for human consumption. Therefore, irrigation water would
not be expected to be treated to reduce the level of microorganisms or other contaminants potentially in the water to the
same standards as water intended for consumption. In one
outbreak, children drank directly from an irrigation
canal while playing outside a home. In two other outbreaks,
water was directly consumed from an irrigation tap by sports
team members. In the first instance, the sports team consumed
water from a labeled irrigation tap despite being informed
that the water was not intended for consumption. In the
second instance, two teams drank from taps on the field
††

¶

Additional information is available at http://www.nsf.org.
** Additional information is available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/
gwr.html.
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Although EPA does not regulate private wells and will not regulate them
as part of the proposed GWR, EPA lists recommendations for protecting
private water supplies at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pwells1.html and
provides links to other sources of information.
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because no other source of potable water was available on
field.
The multistate outbreak of Sa. Bareilly, which was detected
through CDC’s Salmonella Outbreak Surveillance Algorithm
(SODA), epidemiologically implicated the consumption of
bottled water as a risk factor for illness. This is the first widespread outbreak implicating bottled water in the United States.
Previous bottled water outbreaks occurred in New Jersey in
1973 (33), Pennsylvania in 1980 (34), and in the Northern
Mariana Islands in 1993 (4). Bottled water standards and regulations, unlike the majority of drinking water standards, are
not set and enforced by EPA but by FDA. FDA regulates
bottled water as a packaged food product and bases their
bottled water standards on EPA’s tap water standards. In
addition, bottled water might be subject to state and voluntary industry regulation. Bottled water, before this outbreak,
had not been identified as a vehicle for transmission of infectious organisms in the United States, although a bottled
water outbreak of Ca. jejuni associated with consumption of
water bottled in Greece was documented during the 1997–
1998 surveillance period (2). Because of the wide geographic
distribution of bottled water products, an outbreak associated with the consumption of bottled water would be difficult to recognize. FDA, EPA, CDC, and the bottled water
industry together should address concerns regarding consumption of bottled water and public health.
Overall, the number of outbreaks associated with the five
drinking water deficiencies (untreated surface water, untreated
groundwater, treatment deficiency, distribution system deficiency, and unknown/miscellaneous deficiency) increased in
each category from the 1997–1998 levels. The percentage of
outbreaks caused by a treatment deficiency and distribution
system problem decreased relative to reported increases in the
other three categories. Although problems with treatment and
with distribution systems remain critical concerns for safe
drinking water, the public’s lack of understanding of the risk
associated with consumption of untreated water and the
assumption that all water is suitable for consumption is a
concern also.
The relative proportion and number of outbreaks associated with different water systems also differs from the figures
from the 1997–1998 period (Figure 2). Outbreaks in community systems increased from 8 to 11 outbreaks (37.5%
increase); noncommunity outbreaks doubled from 5 to 11;
and individual system outbreaks quadrupled, increasing from
4 to 17 outbreaks. However, the proportion of outbreaks in
community systems decreased from 47.1% during 1997–1998
to 28.2% during 1999–2000, whereas the relative proportion
of outbreaks in individual systems increased from 23.5% during 1997–1998 to 43.6 during 1999–2000. In addition, the
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number of outbreaks reported that were associated with individual systems during this period is the highest reported level
since 1984. The drinking water quality of community systems, which typically have been the focus of increased EPA
regulation, has continually improved. But noncommunity
systems and individual systems, which are not regulated to
the same extent, are continuing problems. The majority of
these individual system outbreaks are linked to currently
unregulated groundwater supplies, specifically private wells.
The populations served by these systems merit increased
attention by public health officials.
The etiologic agent was not identified in 17 (43.6%) of 39
outbreaks (Figure 2). These outbreaks of unknown etiology
comprised the largest group of outbreaks, followed by outbreaks caused by bacteria (nine), parasites (seven), viruses
(four), and chemicals (two). During 1997–1998, parasites
accounted for the largest percentage of the 17 outbreaks (six
[35.3%]), followed by unidentified pathogens (five [29.4%]),
bacteria (four [23.5%]), chemicals (two [11.6%]), and viruses
(zero [0%]). The number of outbreaks per type of agent were
increased for all categories during 1999–2000, with the
exception of chemicals. Although the number of reported
viral outbreaks increased, indicating an improvement in the
availability and usage of laboratory detection methods during previous years, viral outbreaks are probably substantially
underreported. Although viruses were suspected in other outbreaks, specifically in those of unknown etiology, testing for
viruses was not performed. The technology for detection of
viruses in stool and water samples has improved, but testing
for viruses is not widely practiced. Investigators are encouraged to submit clinical specimens to CDC or state laboratories that conduct these tests. Guidelines for collecting stool
specimens for identification of viral organisms are available
from CDC (35). Investigators are also encouraged to contact
CDC and EPA regarding testing of water samples.
Only two outbreaks of chemical origin were identified during this surveillance period, the same number as was reported
during the 1997–1998 period. One outbreak related to a spill
of sodium hydroxide at a community water treatment plant
demonstrated the need for safe water treatment practices. The
other outbreak was a single case of methemoglobinemia in an
infant who required hospitalization after having been fed
boiled water taken from a private well. Coordination of public health messages is critical; an intervention that was
intended to reduce the transmission of infections agents concentrated the chemicals present in the water. These figures, as
in the past, probably underrepresent the actual waterborne
chemical poisonings that occur. Multiple factors can explain
the low reporting rate, including the likelihood that 1) the
majority of waterborne chemical poisonings typically occur
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in private residences and affect a relatively limited number of
persons; 2) exposures to chemicals through drinking water
might cause illness that is difficult to link to a chemical exposure; 3) the mechanisms for reporting waterborne chemical
poisonings to the WBDO surveillance system are not as
established for chemicals as they are for WBDOs attributed
to infectious agents; and 4) health-care providers and those
affected might not as easily recognize chemical poisonings.
As a result of these factors, WBDOs of chemical poisonings
are less likely to be reported to public health officials.
Strengthening the capacity of local and state public health
epidemiologists and environmental health specialists to
detect and investigate outbreaks remains a priority at CDC
and EPA. As part of that effort, CDC and EPA should partner with the states, CSTE, and the Association of Public
Health Laboratories to develop training materials and online
resources that would be useful and easily accessible to local
and state public health personnel. Although no federal regulation exists for monitoring private wells, developing educational materials targeted towards the general public, informing
them of ways to maintain the safety and water quality of their
wells would be valuable. In addition, health messages regarding the consumption of nonpotable water and appropriate
point-of-use treatment should be developed and distributed
to the public.

Outbreaks Associated with Recreational
Water
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Because swimming is essentially a shared water activity or
communal bathing, rinsing of soiled bodies and overt fecal
accidents cause contamination of the water. Unintentional
ingestion of recreational water contaminated with pathogens
can then lead to gastrointestinal illness, even in nonoutbreak
settings (36,37). Fresh and marine waters are also subject to
other modes of contamination from point sources (i.e., sewage releases), watersheds (i.e., runoff from agriculture and residential areas), and floods.
Outbreaks involving gastroenteritis are more frequently
observed during the swimming season, which usually starts
on Memorial Day weekend (the last weekend in May) and
ends Labor Day weekend (the first weekend in September).
However, swimming also occurs year-round in indoor venues
and in states with more temperate climates. Outbreaks of illness by month (Figure 3) include two outbreaks that occurred
noticeably outside the summer months: one outbreak in a
Florida pool in March and another outbreak in an indoor
pool in Wisconsin in January.
As during the previous reporting period, Cr. parvum
accounted for the largest percentage of outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis (44.4%), followed by Es. coli O157:H7
(11.1%), NLV (8.3%), and Shigella (8.3%). An outbreak of
G. intestinalis was also reported in 1999. The last reported
recreational water outbreak of Giardia occurred in 1996. Outbreaks of Ca. jejuni, Es. coli O121:H19, and a mixed Sh. sonnei/
Cr. parvum outbreak were also reported for the first time to
the surveillance system. Outbreaks of unknown etiology comprised 16.7% of the recreational water outbreaks involving
gastroenteritis.

Number of outbreaks

Of the 59 recreational WBDOs, those involving gastroenteritis were most frequently reported (n = 36). The 15
outbreaks reported in 1999 and 21
outbreaks reported in 2000 equal FIGURE 7. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with recreational water,
by year and illness — United States, 1989–2000 (n = 229)*
or surpass the number reported in
40
1998, which previously was the
Other
highest number of outbreaks
35
Dermatitis
involving recreational water-related
Meningoencephalitis
30
gastroenteritis reported in one year
Gastroenteritis
since the inception of the surveil25
lance system. Together, the out20
breaks involving gastroenteritis
reported during the 1999–2000
15
period are higher than the 18 out10
breaks documented in the previous
reporting period (Figures 7 and 8).
5
Since 1989, the number of gastroenteritis-related outbreaks has been
0
gradually increasing, and this
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
increase is statistically significant
Year
(p = 0.01).
* The total from previous reports has been corrected from n = 171 to n = 170.
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FIGURE 8. Number of outbreaks involving gastroenteritis associated with recreational water,
by year and illness — United States, 1978–2000 (n = 146)
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Twenty-two (61.1%) of the 36 outbreaks of gastroenteritis
occurred in treated systems (i.e., pools) that would usually be
expected to be chlorinated or disinfected to prevent transmission of infectious agents after unintentional ingestion.
However, the term treated system might pertain to systems not
routinely treated, including wading pools, interactive
fountains, and in one case, an untreated pool that was served
by a natural hot springs source. Multiple interrelated factors
can impede disinfection in treated venues, including an
increased bather load in a pool, high levels of organic material (e.g., fecal material or environmental or skin debris) and
ultraviolet light, all of which deplete chlorine residuals that
usually maintain protection in the system. In certain outbreaks,
fecal material was indicated on the report as a contributing
factor to the outbreak; the majority of fecal accidents were
attributed to young children who were in or near the water at
the time the accident occurred.
Unlike previous years, a substantial number of different
bacterial and viral organisms were reported as causing gastrointestinal illness in these treated recreational water venues
(Figure 9). Nevertheless, >66% of these outbreaks were
attributed to Cr. parvum (Figure 4). Unlike other organisms,
which are more susceptible to the levels of chlorine typically
found in a pool, Cr. parvum is highly chlorine-resistant and
requires increased levels of chlorine and longer contact times
with chlorine for inactivation. Cr. parvum can survive for days
in public health-mandated chlorine concentrations required
for pools. In addition, its relatively limited size (4–6 µm) can
allow it to pass through particulate filtration systems during

recirculation of water in the pool.
Because a low number of oocysts
might cause illness in a person, even
ingestion of a limited amount of
water can cause infection.
Although the number of Cr.
parvum outbreaks has been steadily
increasing during 1990–2000,
multiple explanations could exist
for the increase. The properties of
the organism, coupled with the
popularity of swimming and the
tendency of persons to aggregate in
larger water venues, increases the
likelihood that swimming water
can become contaminated and that
swimmers will ingest the water and
become infected. However, the
1994 1996 1998 2000
increases in outbreaks could be
explained by a higher awareness of
Cr. parvum as a potential cause of
illness among swimmers by the public health community and
the recreational water industry and, as a result, are more likely
to be detected.
The majority of these Cr. parvum outbreak investigations
noted inadequate pool maintenance. Although low chlorine
levels are unlikely to have been the cause of the outbreaks, the
frequent reporting of low chlorine levels in these outbreaks
indicates a disturbing lack of awareness concerning the role
of chlorine and pH control as the major protective barrier
against infectious disease transmission in pools. Inadequate
disinfectant levels in any pool increases the risk for transmission of chlorine-sensitive pathogens (e.g., Es. coli O157:H7
or Shigella species) if an infected swimmer contaminates the
pool. Pool operators and staff should be appropriately trained
regarding the spread of recreational water illnesses and the
critical role of pool maintenance (i.e., disinfection, pH control, and filtration) in preventing WBDOs.§§
Fourteen outbreaks involving gastroenteritis after freshwater exposure were reported during 1999–2000, compared with
eight during 1997–1998. Es. coli O157:H7 accounted for the
most outbreaks of known etiology (three), followed by NLV
(two), Shigella species (two), Es. coli O121:H19 (one),
G. intestinalis (one), and Cr. parvum (one). Four outbreaks
were of unknown etiology. Certain outbreaks occurred in
beach areas that had substantial numbers of families bathing
and swimming in the water. Again, a common element noted
§§

Guidelines for pool operators and other information related to recreational
water illnesses is available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming.
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FIGURE 9. Number of outbreaks involving gastroenteritis associated with recreational water,
by water type — United States, 1985–2000 (n = 135)
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Number of outbreaks

inadequate disinfection of the
water. The higher temperatures
commonly found in hot tubs
deplete disinfectant levels at a more
25
rapid rate; hot tub operators should
Fresh
be encouraged to actively check
Treated
20
and maintain adequate disinfectant
levels. In addition to rashes, reports
have been received of other symp15
toms. In Alaska, three of 29 persons reported nausea. In the two
10
Maine outbreaks, persons also
reported headache, fatigue, and
5
other symptoms. The Colorado
outbreak was notable for its severe
symptomatology and an extended
0
duration of illness. Extended and
1985–1986 1987–1988 1989–1990 1991–1992 1993–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998 1999–2000
painful rashes associated with
Year
P. aeruginosa outbreaks are unusual
but have been documented
in these reports was the presence of diaper-aged children in
(38,39). One report (39) also indicates that a substantial numthe water, diaper-changing on the beach, and even washing
ber of children are being affected by these outbreaks. In the
off young children in the water. One incident involved perColorado outbreak of P. aeruginosa, the persons affected were
sons who swam in a lake that was had posted signs indicating
primarily children, but no indication was provided that age
that the lake was unsafe for swimming.
was a risk factor for infection. More remarkable is the
Reports of infants and children swimming when they have
observed duration of illness. Certain persons reported chronic
diarrhea is a problem common to both freshwater systems
illness (i.e., rash, joint pain, abdominal pain, and chest pain)
and treated venues. Although health communication messages
that lasted >6 weeks. Using remote pool monitoring services
in two of these outbreaks underscores the need for training
have been targeted in the past for treated venues, similar
pool staff regarding the role of monitoring service and prompt
messages should be provided to those who swimming in freshcommunication between service and pool operators when
water venues. EPA, as part of the Beaches Action Plan, is
problems are detected.
developing guidelines and information for users of freshwa¶¶
Three outbreaks of dermatitis that occurred after persons
ters. Geothermal pools and hot springs should be examined
closely. In one outbreak, pools in a complex were exempt from
swam in fresh or marine water were presumed to be caused by
public health regulation because they were naturally occuran allergic reaction to the cercariae, the larval form of certain
ring hot springs and mineral waters. Hot springs, which feanonhuman species of schistosomes. Cercarial dermatitis was
ture high levels of minerals and elevated temperatures, are
an identified problem in two of these lakes, and signs posted
potentially ideal venues for microbial growth or contaminaby the health department regarding this problem were ignored
tion. These springs and geothermal pools pose an increased
by swimmers. The extent of the problem of cercarial dermatirisk to swimmers, compared with treated pools because of
tis caused by freshwater exposure is unknown, although it
their lack of disinfection and filtration. Improved consumer
probably occurs more frequently than what is reported to the
and staff education and supplementary treatment might be
surveillance system. As schistosomes occur naturally in econecessary to prevent future outbreaks in these enclosed freshsystems that bring snails and birds or aquatic mammals close
water pools.
together, a substantial number of freshwater lakes in the United
Twelve of the 15 outbreaks of dermatitis were associated
States might cause illness among swimmers. Swimmers should
with hot tub or pool use. The majority of these reports of
pay careful attention to where they swim, avoid shallow swimdermatitis are associated with deficient maintenance and
ming areas known to be appropriate snail habitats in lakes
associated with cercarial dermatitis, and report any incidents
¶¶ Additional information is available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/
to their local health department to prevent further illnesses.
beaches.
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The four deaths associated with primary amebic meningoencephalitis (PAM) reported during the 1999–2000
period were all linked to freshwater exposure. Typically, these
cases are associated with swimming in freshwater bodies in
the late summer months because N. fowleri, which has been
implicated in >90% of the cases reported to CDC, proliferate in warm, stagnant waters. Previous cases of PAM have
been reported from states with more temperate climates (e.g.,
California, Florida, and Texas) or from areas with hot springs.
The amoebas associated with PAM are believed to enter
through the nasal passage. Preventing forceful entry of water
up the nasal passages during jumping or diving by holding
one’s nose or wearing nose plugs could reduce the risk for
infection.
Swimming in waters contaminated by animal urine was
the likely explanation for an outbreak of leptospirosis among
persons participating in an adventure race in Guam. Leptospira
species can be found frequently in wild animal urine, and can
be contracted through inhalation of aerosolized water or
ingestion of water while swimming. Leptospirosis can also be
acquired through abrasions. In this instance, the exposure was
associated with immersion of persons’ heads in a body of water
while they swam and swallowed water. Although outdoor
swimming is not necessarily dangerous, swimmers should be
educated regarding the potential risks resulting from swimming in areas that are not secured from wild animal use.
An increased level of bromine, which is used to disinfect
pools and hot tubs, caused certain cases of chemical keratitis.
Inadequate disinfection of a whirlpool resulted in an outbreak
of legionellosis among 20 persons who stayed at a motel. Safe
disinfection practices and appropriate pool maintenance protocols should be communicated to operators and managers
of facilities that treat recreational water.

Outbreaks Associated with Occupational
Exposures to Water
Two outbreaks that do not fit into the previous categories
were reported to CDC by Minnesota and Hawaii. Outbreaks
associated with exposure to aerosolized water have previously
occurred but have not been reported to the WBDO surveillance system (40,41). These outbreaks are discussed in this
report to demonstrate that water exposures are not limited to
ingestion and contact (e.g., through swimming), and these
outbreaks are preventable. Using barrier masks to prevent
inhalation of aerosolized water or disinfection of water that is
not being used for drinking or swimming purposes could have
prevented the respiratory illnesses associated with these two
outbreaks.
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Conclusion
Data collected as part of the national WBDO surveillance
system are used to describe the epidemiology of waterborne
diseases in the United States. Data regarding water systems
and deficiencies implicated in these outbreaks are used to
assess whether regulations for water treatment and monitoring of water quality are adequate to protect the public’s health.
Identification of the etiologic agents responsible for these
outbreaks is also critical because new trends might necessitate
different interventions and changes in policies and resource
allotment.
Surveillance for waterborne agents and outbreaks occurs
primarily at the local and state level. Local and state public
health agencies need to detect and recognize WBDOs and
implement appropriate prevention and control measures.
Improved communication among local and state public health
departments, regulatory agencies, water utilities, and recreational water facilities would aide the detection and control
of outbreaks. Routine reporting or sharing of water-quality
data with the health department is recommended. Other
means of improving surveillance at the local, state, and federal level could include the additional review and follow-up
of information gathered through other mechanisms (e.g.,
issuances of boil-water advisories or reports of illness associated with agents thought to be waterborne).
One repeated observation regarding outbreak data collected
as part of the WBDO system was that the timely collection of
clinical specimens and water samples for testing and commencement of an environmental investigation would have
resulted in an improved ability to detect the outbreak’s etiologic agent and the source of water contamination. However,
the course of an investigation is influenced by the ability and
capacity of public health departments and laboratories to recognize and investigate potential outbreaks of illness. Even when
personnel are available to investigate a potential outbreak in a
timely manner, a common observation is that investigations
cannot always be completed thoroughly. WBDO outbreak
investigations typically require input from different disciplines,
including infectious disease epidemiology, environmental epidemiology, clinical medicine, sanitation, water engineering,
and microbiology. Either further cross-training of existing
personnel needs to be implemented or additional personnel
and resources need to be made available or linked to those
who typically investigate reports of WBDOs.
State health departments can request epidemiologic assistance and laboratory testing from CDC to investigate
WBDOs. CDC and EPA can be consulted regarding engineering and environmental aspects of drinking water and recreational water treatment and regarding collection of
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large-volume water samples to identify pathogenic viruses and
parasites, which require special protocols for their recovery.
Requests for tests for viral organisms should be made to CDC’s
Viral Gastroenteritis Section, Respiratory and Enterovirus
Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National
Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), at 404-639-3577.
Requests for tests for parasites should be made to CDC’s
Division of Parasitic Diseases, NCID, at 770-488-7760.
Additional information is available from
• EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Hotline at 800-426-4791, on
the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/safewater, or by e-mail
at hotline-sdwa@epa.gov;
• CDC’s NCID website at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod;
• CDC’s Healthy Swimming website at http://ww.cdc.gov/
healthyswimming; includes recreational water health communication materials for the general public and pool
maintenance staff (e.g., information regarding disinfection, guidelines on response to fecal accidents [42], fact
sheets concerning recreational water illnesses), and an
outbreak investigation toolkit that can be used by public
health professionals;
• CDC’s Voice and Fax Information System, 888-232-3228
(voice) or 888-232-3299 (fax). Choose cryptosporidiosis
in the disease category; and
• for reporting WBDOs, CDC’s Division of Parasitic Diseases, NCID, at 770-488-7760 or by fax at 770-488-7761.
Acknowledgments

The authors thank the following persons for their contributions
to this report: state waterborne-disease surveillance coordinators;
state epidemiologists; state drinking water administrators; Susan
Shaw, M.S., M.P.H., Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water,
EPA; Robert Tauxe, M.D., Division of Bacterial and Mycotic
Diseases, NCID, CDC; Roger Glass, M.D., Ph.D., Steve Monroe,
Ph.D., and Marc-Alain Widdowson, M.A., Vet.M.B., M.Sc.,
Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, NCID, CDC; Matthew
Arduino, Dr.P.H. and Joe Carpenter, Division of Healthcare Quality
and Promotion, NCID, CDC; Mark Eberhard, Ph.D., Mary
Bartlett, Ali Khan, M.D., James Maguire, M.D., and Dennis
Juranek, D.V.M., Division of Parasitic Diseases, NCID, CDC; and
Lorraine Backer, Ph.D., Division of Environmental Hazards and
Health Effects, National Center for Environmental Health, CDC.
References
1. Craun GF, ed. Waterborne diseases in the United States. Boca Raton,
FL: CRC Press, Inc., 1986.
2. Barwick RS, Levy DA, Craun GF, Beach MJ, Calderon RL. Surveillance for waterborne disease outbreaks—United States, 1997–1998.
In: CDC Surveillance Summaries, May 26, 2000. MMWR
2000;49(No. SS-4):1–35.

27

3. Levy DA, Bens MS, Craun GF, Calderon RL, Herwaldt BL. Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks—United States, 1995–1996.
In: CDC Surveillance Summaries, December 11, 1998. MMWR
1998;47(No. SS-5):1–34.
4. Kramer MH, Herwaldt BL, Craun GF, Calderon RL, Juranek DD.
Surveillance for waterborne-disease outbreaks—United States, 1993–
1994. In: CDC Surveillance Summaries, April 12, 1996. MMWR
1996;45(No. SS-1):1–33.
5. Moore AC, Herwaldt BL, Craun GF, Calderon RL, Highsmith AK,
Juranek DD. Surveillance for waterborne disease outbreaks—United
States, 1991–1992. In: CDC Surveillance Summaries, November 19,
1993. MMWR 1993:42(No. SS-5):1–22.
6. Herwaldt BL, Craun GF, Stokes SL, Juranek DD. Waterborne-disease
outbreaks, 1989–1990. In: CDC Surveillance Summaries, December
1991. MMWR 1991;40(No. SS-3):1–21.
7. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Part 141. Water programs:
national interim primary drinking water regulations. Federal Register
1975;40:59566–74.
8. Pontius FW, Roberson JA. Current regulatory agenda: an update. Journal of the American Water Works Association 1994;86:54–63.
9. Pontius FW. Implementing the 1996 SDWA amendments. Journal of
the American Water Works Association 1997;89:18–36.
10. Environmental Protection Agency. Announcement of the drinking
water contaminant candidate list; notice. Federal Register
1998;63:10274–87.
11. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 141 and 142. Drinking water; national primary drinking water regulations; filtration,
disinfection; turbidity, Giardia lamblia, viruses, Legionella, and heterotrophic bacteria; final rule. Federal Register 1989;54:27486–541.
12. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 141 and 142. Drinking water; national primary drinking water regulations; total coliforms
(including fecal coliforms and E. coli); final rule. Federal Register
1989;54:27544–68.
13. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 141 and 142. Drinking water; national primary drinking water regulations; total coliforms;
corrections and technical amendments; final rule. Federal Register
1990;55:25064–5.
14. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 9, 141, and 142.
National primary drinking water regulations: interim enhanced surface water treatment; final rule. Federal Register 1998;63:69477–521.
15. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 9, 141, and 142.
National primary drinking water regulations: long term 1 enhanced
surface water treatment rule; final rule. Federal Register 2002;67:1812–44.
16. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 9, 141, and 142.
National primary drinking water regulations: long term 1 enhanced
surface water treatment and filter backwash rule; proposed rule. Federal Register 2000;67:19046–150.
17. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 9, 141, and 142,
National primary drinking water regulations: filter backwash recycling
rule; final rule. Federal Register 2001;66:31085–105.
18. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 141 and 141.
National primary drinking water regulations: ground water rule; proposed rules. Federal Register 2000;65:30193–274.
19. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Parts 9, 144, 145, and
146. Underground injection control regulations for class V injection
wells, revision; final rule. Federal Register 1999;64:68545–73.

28

MMWR

20. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 CFR Part 141. National primary drinking water regulations: monitoring requirements for public
drinking water supplies; final rule. Federal Register 1996;61:24353–88.
21. Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Parts 9, 141, and 142.
National primary drinking water regulations for lead and copper.
Final rule. Federal Register 2000;65:1949–2015.
22. US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water. Ambient
water quality criteria for bacteria—1986. Cincinnati, OH: National
Service Center for Environmental Publications, 1986. EPA publication no. 440584002.
23. Dufour AP. Health effects criteria for fresh recreational waters.
Research Triangle Park, NC: US Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Research and Development, Health Effects Research Laboratory, 1984; EPA publication no. 600184004.
24. US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water. Factoids: drinking water and ground water statistics for 2000. Washington, DC: US
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, 2001. EPA publication no. 816K01004. Available at http://www.epa.gov/cgi-bin/
claritgw.
25. US Environmental Protection Agency. EPA safe drinking water information system factoids: FY 1999 inventory data. Washington, DC:
US Environmental Protection Agency, 2002. Available at http://
www.epa.gov/safewater/data/99factoids.pdf.
26. Anonymous. Blastocystis hominis: a new pathogen in day-care centers?
Can Commun Dis Rep 2001;27:76–84.
27. CDC. Protracted outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis associated with swimming pool use—Ohio and Nebraska, 2000. MMWR 2000;50:406–10.
28. CDC. Outbreak of gastroenteritis associated with an interactive water
fountain at a beachside park—Florida, 1999. MMWR 2000;49:565–8.
29. CDC. Pseudomonas dermatitis/folliculitis associated with pools and hot
tubs—Colorado and Maine, 1999–2000. MMWR 2000;49:1087–91.
30. CDC. Methemoglobinemia attributable to nitrite contamination of
potable water through boiler fluid additives—New Jersey, 1992 and
1996. MMWR 1997;46):202–4.

November 22, 2002

31. Jones JL, Lopez A, Wahlquist SP, Nadle J, Wilson M. Survey of clinical laboratory practices, parasitic diseases. Clinical Infectious Diseases
(in press).
32. US General Accounting Office. Drinking water: information on the
quality of water found at community water systems and private wells.
Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 1997. GAO publication no. GAO/RCED-97-123.
33. CDC. Foodborne & waterborne disease outbreaks [Annual summary
1973]. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, CDC, 1974. Publication no. 76-8185.
34. CDC. Water-related outbreaks [Annual summary 1980]. Atlanta, GA:
US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, 1981. Publication no. 82-8385.
35. CDC. “Norwalk-like viruses:” public health consequences and outbreak management. MMWR 2001;50(No. RR-9):1–18.
36. Calderon RL, Mood EW, Dufour AP. Health effects of swimmers and
nonpoint sources of contaminated water. International Journal of
Environmental Health Research 1991;1:21–31.
37. Seyfried PL, Tobin RS, Brown NE, Ness PF. Prospective study of
swimming-related illness. I. Swimming-associated health risk. Am J
Public Health 1985;75:1068–70.
38. Berrouane YF, McNutt LA, Buschelman BJ, et al. Outbreak of severe
Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections caused by a contaminated drain in a
whirlpool bathtub. Clin Infect Dis 2000;31:1331–7.
39. Fiorillo LM, Zucker M, Sawyer D, Lin AN. Pseudomonas hot-foot
syndrome. N Engl J Med 2001;345:335–8.
40. CDC. Sustained transmission of nosocomial Legionnaires disease—
Arizona and Ohio. MMWR 1997;46:416–21.
41. CDC. Legionnaires disease associated with a whirlpool spa display—
Virginia, September–October, 1996. MMWR 1997;46:83–6.
42. CDC. Responding to fecal accidents in disinfected swimming venues
[Notice to readers]. MMWR 2001;50:416–7.

Vol. 51 / SS-8

Surveillance Summaries

29

Appendix A
Selected Case Descriptions of Outbreaks Associated with Drinking Water

Outbreak
date(s)
Parasites
January
1999

State
where
outbreak
occurred

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent

Number
of persons
affected

Case description

Florida

G. intestinalis

2

Persons became ill after drinking well water. Environmental
inspection revealed that pigs were maintained 15 feet from
the well. Fecal coliforms were not detected in the water
samples, but data indicated inadequate levels of chlorine.

June
2000

Minnesota

G. intestinalis

12

Initial water testing confirmed the presence of fecal coliforms
in the drinking water where persons were working in a wildlife refuge. Further investigation of the well revealed that a
drain line from the well pit had been connected to the sewer
line, allowing contamination of the water by raw sewage.

July
2000

New
Mexico

G. intestinalis

4

Persons drinking water provided by others during a rafting
trip became ill. The water was either incorrectly purified
river water or river water that was untreated before consumption.

August
2000

Colorado

G. intestinalis

27

A resort experienced multiple failures in the pumping mechanism and filtration system during drinking water treatment
that resulted in untreated river water entering the drinking
water supply. The water supply included a mix of spring
water and conventionally treated river water that usually was
pumped into and held in a water storage tank. A failure in
the primary system was reported; the backup pump was used,
and multiple filtration cartridges were later determined to
be defective. Although water in the holding tank was usually chlorinated, because of the demands placed on the system during the summer season, chlorine might not have had
adequate time to inactivate Giardia cysts. Giardia was identified in samples from 5 of the 27 affected persons and in
the finished water in the holding tank.

September
2000

Florida

G. intestinalis

2

Persons became ill after drinking water contaminated from
a cross-connection between watering troughs for exotic animals and the drinking water system, which created an
opportunity for back-siphonage of the trough water.
Coliforms were present in the water, but fecal coliforms were
not detected in the water samples. Data indicated inadequate
levels of chlorine.

30

Outbreak
date(s)
September
2000

MMWR

State
where
outbreak
occurred
New
Hampshire

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent
G. intestinalis

Florida

Cryptosporidium
parvum

June
1999

Missouri

August
1999

November
1999

December
2000

Number
of persons
affected
5

November 22, 2002

Case description
Household members used a private well where the waterfiltration system had inadvertently been shut off during a
1-month period by construction workers. The water was not
otherwise treated (e.g., chlorination).

5

An outbreak occurred among persons who had consumed
water from a community system well. The well had a series
of breaks and repairs, including a break reported days before
initial reports of illness. Investigation revealed low levels of
chlorine (0.03 mg/L) in the tap water.

Salmonella
Typhimurium

124

Persons consumed water from a community well that was
routinely disinfected by chlorine, but investigators reported
that chlorine had been inadequate at the time of the outbreak. Seventeen persons were hospitalized.

New York

Ca. jejuni and
Es. coli
O157:H7

781

A fairground was served primarily by chlorinated water, but
certain vendors used water from an unchlorinated shallow
well to make beverages and ice. Epidemiologic data associated illness (including 71 hospitalizations and two deaths)
with consumption of water from that well. Drought conditions had lowered the water table and heavy rains occurring
during the fair might have contributed to contamination of
the well by surface water. Dye tests revealed a cross-connection
between a dormitory septic system and a well on the fairgrounds, but did not confirm the presence of a hydraulic
connection between a nearby manure storage site and the
implicated well. However, testing had occurred 2 months
after the outbreak and after Hurricane Floyd had passed
through the area, raising the water table. Therefore, the possibility of a previous connection during the time of the fair
could not be ruled out. Although stool sampling of ill persons indicated the presence of both Es. coli O157:H7 and
Ca. jejuni, only Es. coli O157:H7 was identified in water samples.

Texas

Es. coli
O157:H7

22

A city well water supply was implicated because all 22 persons received municipal water and had no other common
exposures. Water quality data indicated that the routinely
chlorinated water was inadequately chlorinated for weeks
during the beginning of the outbreak. Subsequent to the
outbreak, a new chlorination system was installed for the
water supply.

B acteria
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Outbreak
date(s)
April
2000
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State
where
outbreak
occurred
Idaho

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent
Es. coli
O157:H7

Number
of persons
affected
4

31

Case description
Children reportedly drank water from the canal in their backyard while playing. Water from the affected household and
from the canal located near the home was tested. Coliforms
were not present in the home’s tap water, but 100 fecal
coliforms/100 mL were present in the canal water. Agricultural runoff might have contributed to contamination of
the canal water.

June
2000

Idaho

Ca. jejuni

15

Contaminated groundwater was implicated in this outbreak
among persons attending a geology summer camp. The
source of water was a spring box, a device used to collect
water, that was incorrectly constructed, potentially allowing
contamination by surface water and agricultural runoff.
Water samples from the spring box were positive for total
coliforms but negative for fecal coliforms. Breaks in the line
running from the spring to the camp were noted. Water in
the campsite hose tested positive for both total and fecal coliforms.

July
2000

California

Es. coli
O157:H7

5

Campers ingested filtered creek water both directly and in
food reconstituted with creek water. They reported defecating near the campsite, and they had defecated in the water
while swimming. In addition, deer droppings, a possible
source of Es. coli O157:H7, were found near the creek.
Although campers also reported swimming in the creek,
swimming could not be implicated as an exposure. Illness
was confirmed through laboratory tests.

August
2000

Utah

Ca. jejuni and
Es. coli
O157:H7

102

Participants at a football camp drank from an irrigation system tap that was not intended for human consumption. No
hospitalizations or deaths were reported. Ca. jejuni was the
most commonly isolated organism among submitted stool
specimens and was also isolated from water samples; Es. coli
O157:H7 and O111 were also isolated from stool specimens, but shiga toxins for these organisms were not found
in water samples.

August
2000

Ohio

Es. coli
O157:H7

29

Persons who had attended a county fair were confirmed for
Es. coli O157:H7 by stool culture. Additional cases of
gastrointestinal illness were identified in the community;
however, either they could not be laboratory-confirmed as
Es. coli O157:H7 or they were probably secondary cases.
Nine of the 29 culture-confirmed persons were hospitalized.
Other potential risk factors (e.g., a particular food item,
beverage, or direct exposure to animals) could not be implicated. However, consumption of food and beverages sold
within a particular area of the fairgrounds was a substantial

32

Outbreak
date(s)

April–
August
2000

MMWR

State
where
outbreak
occurred

10 Southeastern
states:
Alabama,
Arkansas,
Georgia,
Kentucky,
Louisiana,
Missouri,
North
Carolina,
Tennessee,
Virginia,
and West
Virginia

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent

Salmonella
Bareilly

Number
of persons
affected

84

November 22, 2002

Case description
exposure. Investigation revealed that the branch of the distribution system supplying the vendors in the implicated
area also supplied an animal show barn. Spigots connecting
hoses to both the animal areas and the concession stands
were not equipped with backflow-prevention devices. Therefore, possible back-siphonage might have resulted in contamination of the water supply used for human consumption.
Although, water samples taken from the municipal system
supplying the fair and water taken after the closure of the
fair were negative for coliforms, one spigot serving the
implicated vendor area tested positive for coliforms, but negative for Es. coli.
The outbreak was detected by CDC’s Surveillance Outbreak
Detection Algorithm. Forty-three of the 84 persons were
enrolled in a case-control study with 76 matched controls.
The outbreak was associated with drinking bottled water
and water from private wells or springs. Twenty-five persons
drank water from private wells; Sa. Bareilly was recovered
from one patient’s well. The majority of source wells were
located in a limestone area in the southeastern United States;
wells drilled in limestone are subject to contamination from
different sources, including surface water. Among eight persons who did not drink well or spring water in the week
before illness, the consumption of either of two brands of
water bottled by one company was epidemiologically implicated as a risk factor for illness. A Food and Drug Administration (FDA) traceback investigation of the two implicated
brands (spring water and “infant water,” water marketed specifically for consumption by infants) linked the bottled
water to one facility in the southeastern United States. An
investigation of the facilities determined that the two implicated products had different sources, but water flowed
through the same lines before bottling. Infant water was
derived from a municipal source and passed through multiple treatment steps at the facility (separate from the spring
water), and then stored before the bottling process. The bottling process included two filtration steps, ultraviolet irradiation and an nonautomated ozonization step. The bottled
spring water came from water transported from a spring in
north Georgia. After the spring water was fluoridated at the
plant, the spring water shared the same treatment and bottling path as the infant water. Logs from daily in-house testing did not indicate coliforms; however, raw spring water
samples tested by an independent laboratory in June were
positive for total coliforms. Environmental samples collected
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outbreak
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Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent

Number
of persons
affected

33

Case description
by CDC and FDA during the investigation did not yield Sa.
Bareilly, but one of the 105 samples taken from a lot of bottled
water produced in September was positive for Es. coli, and
two of 105 samples were positive for other coliforms. Treatment provided should have been adequate to prevent contamination of the bottled water, but finding coliforms implies
that interruption of treatment or suboptimal operation might
have allowed fecal contamination of the bottled water.
Inspection of the treatment process did not reveal any obvious deficiencies; therefore, the source of the contamination
remains unknown.

Viruses
July
1999

New
Mexico

Small roundstructured virus

June
2000

West
Virginia

June
2000

Kansas

70

At a scout camp, a spring box influenced by surface water
was the key factor in the outbreak. Small round-structured
virus was observed in stool samples from three of 22 specimens submitted. An association with consumption of water
or any drinks prepared with water was observed, although
the numbers were not statistically significant. No other food
items were associated with the outbreak. Assessment of the
drinking water system indicated that the spring box was situated at a lower elevation than the latrines and other buildings with individual septic systems. Water samples taken from
the well and distribution system were positive for fecal coliforms.

Norwalk-like
virus

123

Multiple cohorts of camp attendees reported gastrointestinal illness occurring during a multiweek period. Consumption of food items and a history of swimming were ruled
out as vehicles of transmission. The epidemiologic information could not statistically implicate water as the vehicle of
exposure; however, the environmental investigation determined that two wells that provided the drinking water were
located near a lagoon and one well was visibly contaminated
with sewage. Fecal coliforms were isolated from both wells.

Norwalk-like
virus

86

Persons who attended two different parties at a reception
hall on 2 separate days became ill. The facility’s well water
was the only common source between the two groups, and
the water was not filtered or treated. Norwalk-like virus was
isolated from individual stool specimens from both groups.
Inspection of the well serving the facility indicated improper
well construction, and sampled water tested positive for
coliforms.

34

Outbreak
date(s)
July
2000

MMWR

State
where
outbreak
occurred
California

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent
Norwalk-like
virus

Number
of persons
affected
147

November 22, 2002

Case description
Untreated well water at a camp facility was implicated. Testing identified fecal and total coliforms in one of the wells
and in the areas of the distribution system serving the recreational vehicles and tent areas in the campground.

Chemicals
April
1999

Wisconsin

Nitrate

1

An infant was fed formula prepared with boiled tap water
from a private well for >2 days after the household ran out
of bottled water normally used to prepare infant formula.
The infant became ill, was hospitalized, and was treated to
reverse increased methemoglobin levels. Subsequent testing
of the tap water revealed the presence of fecal coliforms and
nitrate. Inorganic tests for metals were negative.

November
1999

New Jersey

Sodium
hydroxide

2

Lack of a check valve at a community well resulted in spillage of approximately 200 gallons of sodium hydroxide into
a 110,000-gallon well during a multihour period. Although
only two persons reported illness, a cohort estimated at 100–
1,000 persons might have been affected. The first person to
report an adverse effect suffered a first-degree burn from
showering in the contaminated water. The second person
suffered cramps, presumably from ingestion of the water.

Unidentified etiologic agents
January
1999

Florida

Unknown

4

A well was improperly constructed, and water was not routinely disinfected or filtered. Persons interviewed indicated
water had been turbid before the outbreak. Two water samples
indicated coliforms were present.

March
1999

Florida

Unknown

3

An outbreak occurred at an apartment building that usually
received municipal water from a well disinfected with chlorine. The outbreak involved a cross-connection within the
apartment complex to an irrigation well. Total coliforms were
found in samples taken after the outbreak had occurred, but
fecal coliforms were not found. A stool specimen from
one of the affected persons tested negative for bacterial and
parasitic enteric pathogens.

March
1999

Florida

Unknown

6

Outbreak involved a cross-connection to an irrigation well
from a municipal surface water system. The municipal
water system was routinely treated and filtered. The irrigation well in question was in unsatisfactory sanitary condition and was located 25 feet from a commercial septic system
and 10 feet from a garbage container. No clinical testing was
performed.
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State
where
outbreak
occurred
Florida

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent
Unknown

July
1999

California

Unknown

31

An outbreak occurred among persons who visited a camp
cabin. Diarrhea, vomiting, and cramps were reported.
Median incubation period was 24 hours, and median duration of illness was 24 days. The well used for drinking water
was not routinely disinfected or filtered. Water samples tested
positive for fecal coliforms.

July
1999

Washington

Unknown

46

Persons had consumed untreated creek water, but tests for
Cryptosporidium parvum, G. intestinalis, Shigella species,
Salmonella, Ca. jejuni, Es. coli O157:H7, and Yersinia
enterocolitica performed on stool specimens were all negative. One stool specimen was positive for Blastocystis hominis
and another for Endolimax nana. The median incubation
period before onset of illness among the 46 persons was 34
hours (range: 10–95.5 hours), and their median duration of
illness was 38 days (range: 2–192 days).

August
1999

Washington

Unknown

68

Participants of a soccer match reported gastrointestinal illness. The most commonly reported symptoms were diarrhea (72%), vomiting (78%), and nausea (84%). No one
food or beverage item was implicated, but drinking any beverage prepared on site was a substantial risk for illness.
Although contaminants were not identified, the soccer match
took place at a polo field that reportedly had horse manure
at the site. Coliforms were found in the water tested, but
samples taken from the wellhead and the clubhouse were
negative for Es. coli. Stool specimens tested negative for
enteric bacteria and parasites.

April
2000

Florida

Unknown

71

Clinical testing was attempted when the outbreak occurred
among persons who drank water from untreated wells. A
sinkhole in a local lake had developed, allowing water to be
directed into the aquifer. Before the sinkhole was plugged,
water from 78 of the surrounding wells was tested. Nineteen of the wells were negative for coliforms; 33 were positive for total coliforms; and 26 were positive for fecal
coliforms. Cryptosporidium was found in one of the wells.
After the sinkhole was plugged, 58 wells were negative for
coliforms; 21 wells were positive for total coliforms; and none

Outbreak
date(s)
May
1999

Number
of persons
affected
3

Case description
An outbreak occurred after persons in the household began
drinking well water. Well was located 10 feet from a chicken
coop. Duration of illness was approximately 60 days. No
clinical results were provided. Chlorine residuals were not
detected in water samples.

36

Outbreak
date(s)

MMWR

State
where
outbreak
occurred

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent

Number
of persons
affected

November 22, 2002

Case description
was positive for fecal coliforms. No enteric pathogens were
identified in one clinical specimen that was submitted. No
viral testing of either clinical specimens or water samples
was reported.

June
2000

Florida

Unknown

2

An outbreak was associated with consumption of untreated
well water; two persons reported diarrhea that lasted approximately 60 days. The stool specimen collected from one person tested negative for Giardia but positive for B. hominis.
The well was located in an area that had experienced flooding and heavy rainfall before the outbreak. The affected persons indicated that dark residue and air bubbles had appeared
in their water around the time of illness. Environmental
assessment confirmed that the well was in unsatisfactory sanitary condition and noted the presence of grit and air bubbles
in the water. Total coliforms were observed in water samples
taken after disinfection of the well, although fecal coliforms
were absent. The conclusion of the investigators was that
the well might have been contaminated by surface water.

September
2000

California

Unknown

63

An outbreak occurred after football players consumed water
after a game from an irrigation system coupler located on
the playing field. The water was not intended for human
consumption and was subject to contamination from backsiphonage of surface water that collected around the sprinkler heads and control valves. Both total and fecal coliforms
>16,000 most probable number/100 mL were isolated from
the irrigation source water. No hospitalizations or deaths
resulted. Because the median incubation period was 12 hours
(range: 5–31 hours) and the median duration of illness
was also 12 hours (range: 1 hour–3 days), the outbreak was
probably of viral or bacterial origin.
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Appendix B
Selected Case Descriptions of Outbreaks Associated with Recreational Water
State
where
outbreak
occurred

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent

Number
of persons
affected

July and
August
1999

Wisconsin
and Florida

Cryptosporidium
parvum

Both outbreaks were linked to private swimming pools; chlo10 and 6,
respectively rine levels had not been tested in either of these outbreaks.

July
1999

Minnesota

Cr. parvum

10

Chlorine levels were inadequate at a trailer park swimming
pool because the chlorinator needed repair.

July
1999

Massachusetts

Giardia
intestinalis

18

The common exposure for persons affected was swimming
in a local pond. Giardiasis was laboratory-confirmed.
Although the source water was not tested for G. intestinalis,
water tests for the pond indicated high levels of total
coliforms.

June
2000

Ohio

Cr. parvum

700

A swimming pool at a private club was implicated. An
investigation determined that additional risk factors for
cryptosporidiosis (e.g., drinking municipal water, eating
unpasteurized food, or visiting a local zoo) were not statistically significant. However, the investigation did determine
that a substantial risk factor for illness was oral contact with
water. The pool consisted of a zero-entry–level pool (i.e., a
simulated beach entry) that was connected to both a baby
wading pool and adult pool with a water slide. Review of
pool records indicated that on >2 days, the chlorine residual
was inadequate, including on days when the bather load was
high and air temperature hot. In addition, multiple fecal
accidents had been reported. Testing of water samples at
CDC, using Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Method 1622, demonstrated the presence of Cr. parvum
oocysts in the water.*

June
2000

Nebraska

Cr. parvum

225

Surveillance conducted by a county health department
revealed a cluster of laboratory-confirmed cases of
cryptosporidiosis, primarily among persons who were members of two private clubs with swimming facilities (clubs A
and B). Case-control studies were conducted among members of the two clubs. Swimming and being splashed with
pool water at club A was statistically associated with illness.
Club A had four pools: outdoor adult and baby pools and

Outbreak
date(s)

Case description

Parasites

*CDC. Protracted outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis associated with swimming pool use—Ohio and Nebraska, 2000. MMWR 2000;50:406–10.

38

MMWR

Outbreak
date(s)

State
where
outbreak
occurred

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent

Number
of persons
affected

November 22, 2002

Case description
indoor adult and baby pools. The two outdoor pools shared
a filtration system, whereas the two indoor pools had separate filtration systems but were connected by a pipe used to
equilibrate the water level of the pools. Fecal accidents had
occurred before the outbreak. Review of the pool maintenance logs revealed a 2-day period when the baby pool had
not been chlorinated.†

June
2000

Georgia

Cr. parvum

36

Persons reported illness after attending a private pool party
where, in addition to swimming in a neighborhood pool,
party attendees also swam in an inflatable pool. Inadequate
chlorine levels were detected in the neighborhood pool. No
treatment was documented for the inflatable pool.

July
2000

Minnesota

Cr. parvum

7

Inadequate chlorination and filtration were documented in
this outbreak among attendees at a day camp.

July
2000

Minnesota

Cr. parvum

6

Information from interviews implicated a hotel pool in an
outbreak of cryptosporidiosis among members of a baseball
team. Both whirlpool and pool samples were negative for
Cr. parvum.

July
2000

Florida

Cr. parvum

3

Inadequate water quality and low chlorine levels were documented in an outbreak at an apartment complex. Fecal
material had been visible in the pool at the apartment complex.

July
2000

South
Carolina

Cr. parvum

26

Water-quality data from a neighborhood pool implicated in
an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis were inconclusive. Coliform
tests were negative; however, these tests were conducted
after the outbreak had occurred and the pool had been treated
with high levels of chlorine. Chlorine levels at the time of
and after the outbreak were unreported. Certain factors might
have contributed to the outbreak, including a history of
symptomatic children swimming in the pool before the outbreak and increased rain activity that might have decreased
the water quality by diluting chlorine levels or facilitated
runoff into the pool.

July
2000

Minnesota

Cr. parvum

220

An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis occurred at a public swimming beach. A total of 220 persons reporting illness were
asked questions regarding swimming exposure and food consumed while at the beach. Exposure to the water (i.e., getting the head wet while swimming) was associated with

† CDC.

Protracted outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis associated with swimming pool use—Ohio and Nebraska, 2000. MMWR 2000;50:406–10.
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etiologic agent

Number
of persons
affected

39

Case description
illness. The inspection conducted by the county health
department did not identify any plumbing deficiencies at
the beach clubhouse. Reports of construction on a sewer
line were investigated, but the investigators determined that
the source of contamination was persons washing babies in
the lake while changing diapers on the beach.

August
2000

Colorado

Cr. parvum

112

The epidemiologic investigation implicated swimming in
the main pool or having contact with the water as a risk
factor for illness among the persons who attended a private
party at a municipal pool. Although the main pool shared a
silica-sand filtration system with a smaller, adjacent wading
pool, contact with the wading pool was a substantial risk
factor.

August
2000

Florida

Cr. parvum

19

Exposure to the pool at a resort was a substantial risk factor
for infection. In addition, infection was associated with
longer times of exposure to the resort pool water. Complaints
of cloudy water and diapered children swimming in the pool
were reported.

August
2000

Florida

Cr. parvum

5

This outbreak was linked to the outbreak that occurred in
Ohio in June 2000. A family from Ohio who were members
of the implicated swim club vacationed in Florida. While in
a pool in Florida, the ill infant had two fecal accidents.

August
2000

Florida

Cr. parvum

5

Illness was associated with swimming in a pool, and one
infected child reportedly swam while ill. Water quality
information was not available.

August
2000

Minnesota

Cr. parvum

4

This outbreak was detected through routine surveillance. All
four were interviewed by the state health department and
queried about history of illness and exposures to water, food,
animals, and child care centers. All four persons reported
swimming in the same municipal swimming pool. No corrective action was taken. The outbreak was reported after
the pool had closed at the end of the swimming season.

Wisconsin

Es. coli
O157:H7

5

Swimmers who had visited the same beach became ill. The
popular beach featured a shallow, dammed area that was used
for wading. Total and fecal coliforms were detected in water
samples collected before and during the outbreak, although
the levels did not exceed regulatory levels for microbiologic
quality of water. One sample that was tested for Es. coli
O157:H7 was negative.

Bacteria
August
1999

40

Outbreak
date(s)

MMWR

State
where
outbreak
occurred

Suspected
or confirmed
etiologic agent

Number
of persons
affected
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August
1999

Washington

Es. O157:H7

36

A freshwater outbreak occurred among visitors to a state park.
Swimming in the lake, getting lake water in the mouth, and
swallowing water from the lake were all associated with illness. In addition, Es. coli O157:H7 was laboratory-confirmed
among the affected persons, including seven hospitalizations,
and isolated from samples of sediment from the lake as well
as the water.

May
2000

Wisconsin

Legionella
pneumophila

20

A whirlpool was implicated in a serologically confirmed
outbreak of Pontiac fever among 20 persons who visited a
hotel. L. pneumophila group 5 bacteria were isolated from
the whirlpool but not from the swimming pool. Additional
samples collected from sand filters, a water heater, and a
shower also were negative for L. pneumophila. Disinfectant
levels for both the whirlpool and pool were inadequate at
the time of the outbreak. Analysis of responses to questionnaires administered to motel visitors revealed that only whirlpool and swimming pool exposures were substantial risk
factors for illness. No other possible common exposures demonstrated associations with illness. The investigation concluded from both the epidemiologic and environmental data
that the whirlpool was the likely vehicle of transmission.

July
2000

Connecticut

Es. coli
O157:H7

11

The outbreak occurred among persons who lived in or visited the same community during the last 2 weeks of July. An
environmental assessment of both well water and lake water
was conducted. The well water system was found to be in
compliance with drinking water standards, and samples from
two wells and ice made from this water were all negative for
total coliforms. Lake water sampled after the outbreak was
negative for Es. coli and shiga toxins but was positive for
total and fecal coliforms. No other environmental problem
at the lake was identified, and animal feces collected from
local wildlife tested negative for Es. coli O157 or any other
shiga toxin–producing isolates. The environmental assessment, combined with epidemiologic evidence, implicated
swimming at the lake and swallowing water as substantial
risk factors for illness. During this same time period, a toddler with severe diarrhea reportedly had swum in the water
during a 1-week period while ill.

July
2000

Minnesota

Shigella sonnei

15

Fifteen persons reported illness after swimming at a freshwater lake. Of these, 13 tested positive for Sh. sonnei, one
for Cr. parvum, and one for both organisms.
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Minnesota

Sh. sonnei

June
1999

New York

June
1999

January
2000

August
2000

Number
of persons
affected

41

Case description

25

The only shared exposure among the affected persons was
swimming in a particular area of a public beach. Seventeen
persons from >5 families who separately attended the beach
on the same day became ill; these persons did not all attend
the beach together and did not consume the same food products at the beach. Eight other persons, who were identified
through routine surveillance, also reported swimming at the
beach on the date in question. Water samples collected
>2 days after the implicated day did not test positive for
Shigella organisms. Because of the substantial number of children swimming at the lake, a fecal accident was the likely
source of contamination.

Norwalk-like
virus

168

The outbreak was associated with swimming in shallow water
at a freshwater lake. Feces had been removed from the lake
that day by lifeguards.

Idaho

Norwalk-like
virus

25

The outbreak occurred at a resort and water park. The pool
implicated in the investigation was untreated. The source of
the pool’s water was a natural hot springs that was high in
mineral content and was not chlorinated or filtered. The
investigators noted that geothermal pools used for swimming are not required to be regulated by public health officials in that locale. The same pool had been implicated in a
previous outbreak of Norwalk-like virus in June 1996.

Wisconsin

Norwalk-like
virus

9

A motel pool was linked to the outbreak. The affected persons had attended a party where diapered infants were in the
water; they became ill in <48 hours after attending the event.
Stool specimens collected from these persons tested positive
for Norwalk-like virus by reverse-transcriptase polymerase
chain reaction and were negative for enteric bacteria.

June
1999

Illinois

Unknown

25

Persons reported gastrointestinal illness after swimming in a
community lake. A septic system failure had occurred,
resulting in sewage contamination of the lake. Tests of the
lake water on >2 dates before and after the first case was
reported were all positive for fecal coliforms.

June
1999

California

Unknown

23

An outbreak of suspected viral etiology occurred among persons who attended three separate pool parties at an apartment complex. Initially, the outbreak was reported as a
possible foodborne outbreak, but no food items had been

uses
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shared among the persons who had attended the three parties. Moreover, persons who only ate and did not swim in
the pool did not report illness. Stool specimens collected
from two persons tested negative for bacterial and parasitic
pathogens. No indication was provided that viral testing was
done. The health department conducted a physical inspection of the pool and examined pool maintenance records.
No water testing was performed by the health department,
nor were pool maintenance records available for the dates
immediately after the day of exposure, although reported
chlorine levels seemed adequate. However, swimmers
reported that on the day in question, the pool was overcrowded and that toddlers were swimming in the pool.

August
1999

Florida

Sh. sonnei and
Cr. parvum

38

The outbreak occurred among persons who visited a beach
park, and it was attributed to both Sh. sonnei and Cr. parvum.
Illness was epidemiologically linked to playing in an interactive fountain at the park, ingesting water, and consuming
food and beverages at the fountain. The fountain’s recirculation and disinfection systems were not approved by the
health department and were inadequate or not completely
operational at the time of its use. Samples of the fountain
water tested positive for coliforms but did not test positive
for fecal coliforms. Nevertheless, the cause of the outbreak
was determined to be the fountain, which was closed until
the health department’s concerns could be remedied.§

September
1999

Texas

Unknown

12

Persons reported symptoms that included exhaustion, sore
muscles, headache, chills, and fever after attending a conference at a Texas guest ranch. One woman reported a miscarriage during her illness. Exposure to a hot tub, defined as
either immersion or being near the hot tub, was associated
with illness. Although clinical specimens (urine, blood, sputum, and throat swabs) were tested for organisms, including
Leg. pneumophila serogroups 1 and 6, influenza virus, parainfluenza virus, and adenovirus, no infectious agent was identified. No testing for biologic or chemical agents was
performed on water samples because the hot tub had already
been drained, refilled, and hyperchlorinated before the
environmental investigation.

§ CDC.

Outbreak of gastroenteritis associated with an interactive water fountain at a beachside park—Florida, 1999. MMWR 2000;49:565–8.
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February
2000

Vermont

Bromine

March
2000

Maine

P. aeruginosa

May
2000

Florida

July
2000

Number
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affected
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Case description

3

Chemical keratitis resulted from exposure to bromine in a
hotel swimming pool. Bromine levels were >5 ppm (acceptable bromine levels are 1–3 ppm), and the pH level was >8.5.
Patrons that spent time with their heads underwater with
their eyes open were affected.

11

An outbreak of dermatitis affected persons who had stayed
at a hotel during a sports tournament. These persons
reported having a rash that was accompanied by other symptoms, including ear infection, cough, headache, and joint
pain. P. aeruginosa was isolated from water samples from
both the pool and hot tub. The investigator also indicated
that disinfection might have been hindered by a high number
of swimmers and the addition of water to the leaking pool.

Unknown

2

Persons became ill after swimming in a lake that was not
licensed as a bathing area and had signs posted indicating
that the area was unsafe for swimming. No water testing
results were available before or after the incident. The lake
had been closed for swimming for years, and routine samples
had not been collected.

Maine

Unknown

32

Swimming at a beach in a campground was epidemiologically implicated in an outbreak of gastrointestinal illness.
Affected persons reported a combination of symptoms,
including diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, cramps, and headache
that lasted 5–48 days. Only one stool specimen was collected, which tested negative for bacterial pathogens; therefore, the outbreak was of suspected viral etiology. However,
no tests for parasitic organisms were reported. The environmental assessment and interviews indicated that the presence of diapered children, a heavy bather load, and warm
water temperatures were contributing factors to the outbreak.
Water samples tested negative for coliforms.

July
2000

Florida

Unknown

4

Affected persons reported swimming in a freshwater spring
that had a history of inadequate water quality. Water samples
from the spring’s swimming areas were positive for total and
fecal coliforms on multiple dates. Drinking water at this
facility was also tested but was negative for coliforms.

August
2000

Florida

Unknown

9

A motel pool that was cloudy and dirty at the time of exposure was implicated. Persons who swam in the pool and did
not share any other common exposure became ill with gastroenteritis. Disinfectant residuals and operation of the fil-
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tration system at the time of the investigation were deficient.
Problems had also occurred with the equipment used for
adjusting pH.

October
2000

Alaska

P. aeruginosa

29

In an outbreak of dermatitis, the median number of persons
in the implicated hotel pool and hot tub was greater than
the maximal bather loads permitted. The maximum bather
load for the pool was nine persons, and for the hot tub, six
persons. On the basis of interviews, the median numbers of
persons were determined to be 12 (range: 4–20) in the pool
and 10 (range: 3–20) in the hot tub. The pool and hot tub
were on separate filtration systems. Sand from the pool
filter and water from the filter both tested positive for
P. aeruginosa. The filtration system was suspected as having
malfunctioned sometime during the day of exposure and
had been unable to maintain adequate levels of disinfection
to accommodate the excessive bather load.
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Glossary
Action level

A specified concentration of a contaminant in water. If this concentration is reached or
exceeded, certain actions (e.g., further treatment and monitoring) must be taken to comply with
a drinking water regulation.

Back-siphonage

A reversal of the normal flow of water or other liquid caused by a negative-pressure gradient
(e.g., within a water system).

Boil-water advisory

A statement to the public advising that tap water must be boiled before drinking it.

Cercarial dermatitis

Dermatitis caused by contact with the cercariae (larval stage) of certain species of schistosomes
whose normal hosts are birds and nonhuman mammals.

Class

Waterborne-disease outbreaks are classified according to the strength of the epidemiologic and
water-quality data implicating water as the source of the outbreak (see Table 1).

Coagulation

The process of adding chemicals to water to destabilize charges on naturally occurring particles
to facilitate their subsequent aggregation and removal by flocculation or filtration.

Coliforms

All aerobic and facultative anaerobic, gram-negative, nonspore-forming, rod-shaped bacteria
that ferment lactose with gas formation within 48 hours at 95ºF (35ºC).

Community water
system

A public water system that serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile
home park that has >15 service connections or an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year.

Contact time

The length of time water is exposed to a disinfectant (e.g., chlorine contact time).

Cross-connection

Any actual or potential connection between a drinking water supply and a possible source of
contamination or pollution (e.g., a wastewater line).

Cyst

The infectious stage of Giardia intestinalis and certain other protozoan parasites that have protective walls that facilitate their survival in water and other environments.

Disinfection
by-products

Chemicals formed in water through reactions between organic matter and disinfectants.

Distribution system

Water pipes, storage reservoirs, tanks, and other means used to deliver drinking water to consumers or store it before delivery.

Excystation

The release of the internal (i.e., encysted) contents (e.g., trophozoites or sporozoites) from cysts
or oocysts.

Fecal coliforms

Coliforms that grow and produce gas at 112.1ºF (44.5ºC) within 24 hours.

Filter backwash

Water containing the material obtained by reversing the flow of water through a filter to dislodge the particles that have been retained on it.

Filtration

The process of removing suspended particles from water by passing it through one or more
permeable membranes or media of limited diameter (e.g., sand, anthracite, or diatomaceous
earth).

46

MMWR

November 22, 2002

Finished water

The water (e.g., drinking water) delivered to the distribution system after treatment, if any.

Flocculation

The water-treatment process after coagulation that uses gentle stirring to cause suspended particles to form larger, aggregated masses (floc). The aggregates are removed from the water by a
separation process (e.g., sedimentation, flotation, or filtration).

Free, residual chlorine
level

The concentration of chlorine in water that is not combined with other constituents, thus serving as an effective disinfectant.

Groundwater system

A system that uses water extracted from the ground (i.e., a well or spring).

Groundwater under
the direct influence
of surface water

Any water beneath the surface of the ground with substantial occurrence of insects or other
macrooganisms, algae, or large-diameter pathogens (e.g., Giardia intestinalis or — for subpart H
systems serving >10,0000 persons only — Cryptosporidium parvum, or substantial and relatively
rapid shifts in water characteristics (e.g., turbidity, temperature, conductivity, or pH that closely
correlate to climatological or surface water conditions. Direct influence must be determined for
individual sources in accordance with criteria established by the state. The state determination of
direct influence might be based on site-specific measurements of water quality or documentation
of well construction characteristics and geology with field evaluation.

Heterotrophic
microflora

Microorganisms that use organic material for energy and growth.

Infant water

Bottled waters that are marketed for direct consumption by infants or use in mixing with infant
formula.

Individual (or private)
water system

A water system not owned or operated by a water utility and that serves <15 residences or farms
not having access to a public water system.

Maximumcontaminant level

The maximum permissible concentration (i.e., level) of a contaminant in water supplied to any
user of a public water system.

Nephelometric
turbidity units

The units in which the turbidity of a sample of water is measured when the degree to which light
is scattered is assessed with a nephelometric turbidimeter.

Noncommunity water
system

A public water system that 1) serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business that
is used by the public for >60 days/year, 2) has >15 service connections or serves an average of >25
persons, and 3) is not a community water system.

Nontransient
noncommunity
water systems

Public water systems that serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g., a factory or
school).

Oocyst

The infectious stage of Cryptosporidium parvum and certain other coccidian parasites with a
protective wall that facilitates survival in water and other environments.

Public water system

A system, classified as either a community water system or a noncommunity water system, that
provides piped water to the public for human consumption and is regulated under the Safe
Drinking Water Act.

Raw water

Surface water or groundwater that has not been treated in any way.
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Reverse osmosis

A filtration process that removes dissolved salts and metallic ions from water by forcing it through
a semipermeable membrane. This process is also highly effective in removing microbes from
water.

Source water

Untreated water (i.e., raw water) used to produce drinking water.

Surface water

The water in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, and oceans.

Total coliforms

Nonfecal and fecal coliforms that are detected by using a standard test. Total coliforms are a
group of closely related bacteria that are usually free-living in the environment, but are also
normally present in water contaminated with human and animal feces. With certain exceptions,
they do not cause disease. Specifically, coliforms are used as a screen for fecal contamination as
well as to determine the efficiency of treatment and the integrity of the water distribution system. The presence of total coliforms in drinking water indicates that the system is either fecally
contaminated or vulnerable to fecal contamination.

Transient
non-community
water systems

Public water systems that regularly serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months/year (e.g.,
highway rest stations, restaurants, and parks with their own public water systems).

Turbidity

The quality (e.g., of water) of having suspended matter (e.g., clay, silt, or plankton) that results
in loss of clarity or transparency.

Untreated water

Surface water or groundwater that has not been treated in any way (also called raw water).

Water quality
indicator

A microbial, chemical, or physical parameter that indicates the potential risk for infectious diseases associated with using the water for drinking, bathing, or recreational purposes. The best
indicator is one whose density or concentration correlates best with health hazards associated
with a type of hazard or pollution.

Water utility

A water provider that distributes drinking water to a community through a network of pipes.

Watershed

An area from which water drains to a single point; in a natural basin, the area contributing flow
(i.e., water) to a place or point on a stream.

Watershed-control
program

A program to protect a watershed from contamination or pollution.
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